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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Use Tax-Collection in Interstate Commerce.
Section 21 of the Iowa Use Tax Act' provides that the State
Board of Assessment and Review may, upon failure of any retailer
maintaining a place of business within the state to collect from the user
or purchaser and remit to the Board the tax imposed upon the use
of goods within the state, revoke the permit of such retailer to do
business within the state. P maintained twelve retail stores in Iowa
and had complied with the provisions of the Act as to all sales of mer-
I Iowa Acts 1937, c. 198 (passed as a supplement to the Sales Tax Act, Iowa
Acts 1937, c.196).
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chandise in such stores. But it had not collected the tax imposed by
the Act determined by the purchase price of the sales made by its
mail-order establishments in other states directly to residents in the
State of.Iowa. P, having failed to heed the order of the Board to
show cause why it should not comply with the provisions of the Act,
filed suit 2 in a federal district court alleging the unconstitutionality of
this section, and seeking a temporary injunction restraining the de-
fendants from revoking the licenses of its retail stores within the state.
Held, suit should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, federal district
courts being denied by statutes jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of
any state tax where a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy may be had
at law or in equity in the courts of such state.
The use tax is a comparatively new form of taxation designed to
supplement the sales tax and to eliminate its evasion by persons mak-
ing their purchases outside the state. It was foreshadowed by the
terms of several of the gasoline tax laws which taxed the storage,
withdrawal from storage, and use of gasoline, the sale of which might
not be directly taxed on account of the restrictions of the interstate
commerce clause. The use tax is levied on the same classes of property
and the rate is the same as that of the sales tax. Generally, tax liability
is placed upon the person storing, using, or consuming certain types
of tangible personal property within the state, wherever acquired,
credit being allowed for sales tax already paid within the state, and
in some instances for a like tax paid on purchases made out of the
state.4
The constitutionality of the use tax has been sustained against the
claim that it violates the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.5
While the tax is imposed on the use of property within the state, the
retailer is required to collect it from the usei and pay it to the state.
This method of collection has been repeatedly sustained in its applica-
tion to sales made by the retailer called upon to collect and pay the
2 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Roddewig, 24 F. Supp. 321 (S. D. Iowa 1938).
REv. STAT. §§563, 629 (1875), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(1) (Supp. 1937). "
'Ran. Laws 1937, c.375, §4(c); Miss. Laws 1938, c. 114, §6(b); Utah
Laws 1937, c. 114, §4(d) ; Wash. Laws 1935, c. 180, §32(c).5 Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 Sup. Ct. 524, 81 L. ed.
814 (1937), (1937) 1 MD. L. REv. 263, (1937) 35 MicH. L. REv. 1385, (1937)
10 So. CALi. L. REv. 516. Further authority on the validity of a tax imposed
upon the use of goods after interstate commerce has ceased and they have come
to rest in a state may be found in: Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S.
472, 52 Sup. Ct. 631,; 76 L. ed. 1232 (1932), 84 A. L. R. 839 (1933); Nash-
ville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct. 345, 77 L. ed.
730 (1933) ; Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc., 289 U. S. 249, 53 Sup. Ct.
591, 77 L. ed. 1155 (1933); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 54
Sup. Ct. 575, 78 L. ed. 1141 (1934); Southern Pac. Co. v. Corbett, 23 F. Supp.
193 (N. D. Cal. 1938); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Corbett, 23 F. Supp. 197
(N. D. Cal. 1938); Powell v. Maxwell, '210 N. C. 211, 186 S. E. 326 (1936),
note (1936) 15 N. C. L. RFv. 73.
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tax." The question left undecided in this case is whether the state may
require a retailer making sales within the state, under penalty of re-
vocation of its license to do business, to collect and pay an admittedly
valid tax growing out of a transaction between an extrastate seller,
engaged only in making mail-order sales direct to local buyers, where
the power of the state over the local retailer grows out of the fact that
the local retail business and the mail-order business are conducted by
the same corporation. If this device is sustained it should play an
important part in making possible the collection of the use tax from
extrastate mail-order houses where they maintain local establishments
for sales at retail.
Apart from the problem whether the licenses of the retail stores
may be revoked for the default of the company in connection with the
mail-order business, the question arises whether the duty of collecting
use taxes can be imposed upon such a mail-order enterprise in the first
place without placing a burden on interstate commerce. Two recent
federal decisions furnish very persuasive authority for an affirmative
answer. In Monanotor Oil Co. v. Johnson7 the complainant was a
foreign corporation engaged in shipping gasoline into Iowa for the
purpose of resale to consumers and dealers who sell to consumers. It
sought an injunction against the enforcement of the provisions of an
act making it a collector of an excise tax, imposed on the use of gasoline
as motor fuel within the state, as regards gasoline shipped by it from
out of state to buyers in Iowa. The United States Supreme Court
denied the injunction and refused to support the complainant's conten-
tion that such a requirement was unconstitutional by saying: "The
statute obviously was not intended to reach transactions in interstate
commerce,8 but to tax the use of motor fuel after it had come to rest
in Iowa, and the requirement that the appellant as the shipper into
Iowa shall, as agent of the state, report and pay the tax on gasoline
thus coming into the state for use by others on whom the tax falls
imposes no unconstitutional burden either upon interstate commerce
or upon the appellant." Although the Court in the Monamotor case
was willing to uphold the imposition upon a foreign corporation of the
duty of collecting a tax upon property shipped to its customer for
resale within a state, it is necessary to go a step further to hold that
I Citizens Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 443, 30 Sup. Ct. 532, 54 L. ed.
832 (1910) ; Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U. S. 137, 44 Sup. Ct. 251, 68 L.
ed. 593 (1924); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 54 Sup. Ct. 575,
78 L. ed. 1141 (1934); Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114, 239 S. W.
753 (1922); Standard Oil Co. v. Jones, 48 S. D. 482, 205 N. W. 72 (1925).
"292 U. S. 86, 54 Sup. Ct. 575, 78 L. ed. 1141 (1934).
'Actual.ly, the tax was levied on all gasoline imported, but in view of the
provision that the tax should be refunded as to gasoline subsequently exported
from the state it was not considered a tax on importation alone, which would
have been a burden on interstate commerce.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the imposition of that duty is not a burden upon interstate commerce
when the corporation, as in the principal case, has an agent in the
state but contracts with and ships directly to individual consumers.
This additional step was taken in Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. CorbettO
where a federal district court upheld as valid the imposition upon the
complainant, an Illinois corporation, of a requirement of the California
Use Tax Act 10 that it should, as a retailer maintaining a place of busi-
ness within the state within the meaning of the Act, collect the use tax
on goods it sold in California. Although sales offices were maintained
in California, all orders for goods were filled from complainant's Illinois
office, shipment usually being made directly to the purchaser; and all
payments by the purchasers were made directly to the complainant at
its Illinois office. The court refused to grant complainant an injunction
against the enforcement of this provision of the Act, and dismissed the
contention that it violated the commerce clause and the 14th Amend-
ment by saying: "In this respect, we are unable to distinguish the stat-
ute here involved from the one upheld in the case of Monamotor Oil
Co. v. Johnson."" Though the court in the Felt case relied entirely on
the Monamotor case and made no distinction between the two fact situa-
tions, there exists a further distinction which has received some recog-
nition from the United States Supreme Court.1 2 In the Monamotor
case although it did not appear that the purchaser made his payment
to the agent located within the state, gasoline taxes are usually handled
in this way, while in the Felt case all payments were made outside the
state. These distinctions should be of no importance in determining
whether such a collection provision is a burden upon interstate com-
merce, when the tax itself is free of such a defect.
The question remains as to the power of the state to revoke the
license to do business of the local retailer for failure to collect a tax
due from the extrastate mail-order business in which it took no part.
It might be objected that the revocation of the complainant's license for
'Z3 F. Supp. 186 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
"CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 8495a.
"23 F. Supp. 186, 191 (S. D. Cal. 1938).
In New York, L. E. & W. R. R. v. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 628, 14 Sup.
Ct. 952, 38 L. ed. 846 (1894), the United States Supreme Court held uncord-
stitutional a requirement that a foreign corporation doing business within the
state should withhold an intangible tax from bond interest paid to resident bond-
holders when such interest was payable outside the state. Though the basis for
the decision was that there was an impairment of a contractual obligation ex-
isting between the state and the railroad company, the Court nevertheless made
a point of the fact that the state could not compel such action when the trans-
action sought to be affected was conducted outside the state. But in Travis v.
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U. S. 60, 40 Sup. Ct. 228, 64 L. ed. 460 (1920),
the Court upheld a provision requiring a foreign corporation doing business
within the state to withhold an income tax from the salaries of non-resident
employees, the salaries being earned in that jurisdiction and being capable of
payment within the state.
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failure to comply with this provision is a deprivation of property with-
out due process of law. By way of dictum in the principal case the
court said: The revocation of a license to do business in a State
does not in all cases, if ever, deprive the licensee of property without
due process in violation of the 14th Amendment. ' 13 In Hamnwnd
Packing Co. v. Arkansas' 4 the United States Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of an Arkansas statute providing for license re-
vocation as applied to a foreign corporation doing business in Arkansas
which, outside of that state, entered a pool to regulate prices in states
other than Arkansas. The Court considered the right to revoke the
licenses of foreign corporations to be plenary, capable of being exercised
in consideration of acts done in another jurisdiction, the motive of
the legislature being, for purposes of due process, immaterial. This
authority, which is in accord with other decisions,' 5 upholds the power
of the state to regulate, within constitutional limitations, 1 the out-of-
state activities of foreign corporations doing business within its bound-
aries, and to revoke their licenses for failure to submit to such regu-
lation.
The Monamotor case has been criticised 7 as giving only slight con-
sideration to the merits of the problem of the validity of a statute bur-
dening a seller in interstate commerce with the collection of a tax,
even though the tax be valid; and the same criticism would apply
equally as well to the Felt case.
If the collection provision of the statute should be enforced against
an out-of-state mail-order company maintaining retail stores within
the state, the company might seek to avoid collecting the tax by in-
corporating such stores. But the Iowa Act anticipates such an ex-
pedient by making its definition of retailers (which would include mail-
123 F. Supp. 321, 325 (S. D. Iowa 1938). But a federal district court held
invalid as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Con-
stitution, a Washington statute providing for the cancellation of licenses of
resident wholesalers purchasing products of non-resident brewers if the brewers
refused to obtain wholesalers' licenses to do business in the state. Pacific Fruit
& Produce Co. v. Martin, 16 F. Supp. 34 (W. D. Wash. 1936).
14212 U. S. 322, 29 Sup. Ct. 370, 53 L. ed. 530 (1909).
'" See Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 262, 274, 30 Sup. Ct. 330, 334,
54 L. ed. 472, 477 (1910); Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68,
83, 34 Sup. Ct. 15, 18, 58 L. ed. 127, 133 (1913); Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v.
Mississippi, 257 U. S. 129, 137, 42 Sup. Ct. 42, 44, 66 L. ed. 166, 171 (1921);
Paramount Pictures v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890, 900 (D. N. D. 1938).
u".. . the State has the power and constitutional right arbitrarily to ex-
clude the plaintiff without other reason than that such is its will." But not when
".. .the so-called right is used as part of 'a scheme to accomplish a forbidden
result. Thus the right to exclude a foreign corporation cannot be used to pre-
vent it from resorting to a federal court; or to tax it upon property that by
established principles the State has no power to tax; . .. or to interfere with
interstate commerce." Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Tafoya, 270 U. S.
426, 434, 46 Sup. Ct. 331, 332, 70 L. ed. 664, 667 (1926).
"'Warren and Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays
Its Way (1938) 38 COL. L. Rxv. 49, 78.
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order houses) maintaining a place of business within the state, and
therefore subject to the provisions of the statute, broad enough to in-
clude those maintaining "directly or by a subsidiary, an office . . . or
other place of business, or any agent operating within this state un-
der the authority of the retailer or its subsidiary". 8 By the application
of this statutory definition to the Iowa subsidiaries of the foreign cor-
poration, the Board could "look through" the corporate entity 9 for the
purpose of enforcing the requirement that out-of-state mail-order com-
panies collect the use tax on goods shipped to purchasers located within
the state.
Considerable difficulty may be experienced by a state seeking to
impose the duty of collecting a use tax upon a non-resident merchant
who sells goods for consumption within the state without maintaining
therein any place of business. Before such a requirement may be im-
posed, the state must be able to serve process upon some agent of the
company, so that it may be brought within its jurisdiction.20  Where
the sales are made directly to consumers through mail-order contracts
with companies maintaining no agent or agency within the state, no
such collection requirement can be enforced, for the state has no means
by which it can legally subject the out-of-state retailer to its control.
However, with regard to concerns that carry on an interstate busi-
ness by employing agents or drummers to solicit orders, directing the
orders to the home office for acceptance and delivery and also direct-
ing payment to be made to the home office, a state might be more suc-
cessful even though such companies maintain no office, store, ware-
house, distributing, or collecting agency within the state. The power
of the states to regulate the activities of non-residents within their bor-
ders has received a great deal of attention by the Supreme Court of
the United States in considering statutes 21 authorizing service of proc-
ess upon some state official in actions against non-resident motorists.
The Sfipreme Court 'established by these decisions22 that a state may,
' Iowa Acts 1937, c. 198, §1(6).
"Buick Motor Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 48 F. (2d) 801 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U. S. 655, 52 Sup. Ct. 34, 76 L. ed. 556 (1931); Palmolive
Co. v. Conway, 56 F. (2d) 83 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932), cert. denied, 287 U. S.
601, 53 Sup. Ct. 8, 77 L. ed. 524 (1932) (where statute provided for looking
through the corporate entity in case of an arrangement to evade taxes) ; Breck-
enridge, Tax Escape by Manipulations of Holding Company (1931) 9 N. C. L.
REv. 189, 192; note (1931) 29 MicH. L. REv. 600; (1931) 31 CoL. L. REV. 719.
o Some duly authorized agent of the company who is capable of receiving
service on behalf of the company must be available ta the officers of the state
for such service.
2 These statutes and the decisions affecting them are discussed at length in:
Culp,, Process in Actions Against WNon-Resident Motorists (1934) 32- M H. L.
REV. 325; Culp, Recent Developments In Actions Against Nonresident Motorists
(1938) 37 MicH. L. REv. 58.
'Hess v. Pawloskl, 274 U. S. 352, 47 Sup. Ct. 632, 71 L. ed. 1091 (1927);
Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13, 48 Sup. Ct 259, 72 L. ed. 446, 57 A. L. R.
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in the exercise of the police power, provide that non-residents who
operate automobiles on her highways, even though engaged directly
and solely in interstate commerce, shall be deemed to have appointed
the secretary of state as agent to accept service of process. If the state
should impose the same requirements on drummers engaged in inter-
state commerce, making them susceptible to service of process, either
through service on the secretary of state as their agent or through a
non-discriminatory requirement that all drummers, engaged in the pro-
motion of interstate or intrastate business, register with the state for
the purpose of being subjected to service of process, it might be pos-
sible that the courts would extend the due ,process view adopted in
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman23 so as to make the process
served on such agents effective asservice on the principal. By subject-
ing the out-of-state principal to the jurisdiction of the state courts the
tax officials might then recover judgment against it for failure to collect
the tax on goods sold to purchasers within the state. Such judgment
would be entitled to full faith and credit24 in the courts of other states
wherein the company has property subject to execution, provided the
judgment procured through such a procedure be sustained as a valid
one. The validity of such a procedure is purely speculative. In order
that it be sustained it will be necessary for the courts, actuated by a
desire to enable the states to secure a more efficient administration of
their taxes, to distinguish such a statute from those attempting to sub-
ject a foreign company engaged exclusively in interstate business to
a suit by any and all of the residents of the state as did the statutes
invalidated in Sioux Remedy Co. v. Cope25 and Furst v. Brewster.2"
Is it not possible that the Supreme Court might take a step beyond
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.27 and Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson,28
in which it upheld the validity of the use tax and its collection provi-
sions, and further enable the states to secure a greater degree of effi-
ciency in the use of a valid means to collect a valid tax?
FRANK THOMAS MILLER, JR.
Contracts-Releases for Personal Injuries--
Rescission-Mistake.
In an action to recover damages for the injuries and death of P's
husband by reason of D's negligence, D set up as an affirmative defense
1239 (1928); Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253, 53 Sup. Ct. 599, 77 L. ed. 1158(1933), 88 A. L. R. 174 (1934).
'294 U. S. 623, 55 Sup. Ct. 553, 79 L. ed. 1097 (1935).
'Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 56 Sup. Ct. 229, 80 L. ed.
220 (1935) (judgment for taxes entitled to full faith and credit).
'235 U. S. 197, 35 Sup. Ct. 57, 59 L. ed. 193 (1914).
'282 U. S. 493, 51 Sup. Ct. 295, 75 L. ed. 478 (1931).
'300 U. S. 577, 57 Sup. Ct. 524, 81 L. ed. 814 (1937), cited supra note 5.
" 292 U. S. 86, 54 Sup. Ct. 575, 78 L. ed. 1141 (1934).
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a release given by the deceased. There was evidence that the deceased
and D had relied upon a statement by the latter's physician that the
ill-effects of the accident were superficial and that, upon their gradual
disappearance, deceased's recovery would be complete. Deceased had
died five months later. To the plea of a settlement in bar of P's right
of action, she replied, alleging mistake as to the extent of deceased's
injuries in the execution of the release. There was a verdict for P,
but the lower court was reversed for error in instructing the jury that
a unilateral mistake would be sufficient to avoid the release.' Accord-
ing to the North Carolina court, a mistake, to have this effect, must
be mutual. This view represents the weight of authority.'
It is well established that a mutual mistake as to a material fact
is a sufficient ground for the rescission of a release of a claim for per-
sonal injuries3 provided the parties did not intend to make a final
settlement, so all-inclusive that mistake would be within the realm of
the bargain.4 A settlement in which the parties contract in conscious
ignorance of the consequences of the accident and compromise with
reference to ,unknown as well as known injuries is one in which mistake
as to any injury is within the bargain since it relates to a factor that
the parties had contracted about and considered in fixing the terms
of the release. However, where the parties intend merely to settle for
known injuries a mistake as to the extent of these injuries or the exist-
ence of other injuries will, of course, not be within the bargain. Con-
sequently, courts, sympathetic to the position of the releasor laboring
under mistake, tend to construe these agreements as of this type rather
than as all-inclusive compromises. 5 Especially is this so where the
releasee or his physician misrepresents, even though innocently, re-
'Cheek v. Southern Ry., 214 N. C. 152, 198 S. E. 626 (1938).2 Weathers v. Kansas City Bridge Co., 99 Kan. 632, 162 Pac. 957 (1917);
see Reddington v. Blue, 168 Iowa 34, 43, 149.N. W. 933, 936 (1914); Dominicis
v. United States Casualty Co., 132 App. Div. 553, 116 N. Y. Supp. 975, 976(3d Dep't 1909); White v. Richmond & D. R. R. 110 N. C. 456, 461, 15 S. E.
197, 199 (1892).
'Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Dashiell, 198 U. S. 521, 25 Sup. Ct. 737, 49 L. ed.
1150 (1904); Great Northern Ry. v. Reid, 245 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917);
Southwest Pump & Mach. Co. v. Jones, 87 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937);
St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. v. Hambright, 87 Ark. 614, 113 S. W. 803 (1908);
Tatman v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. R., 10 Del. Ch. 105, 85 Atl. 716 (Ch. 1913);
Wolf v. Cudahy Packing Co., 105 Kan. 317, 182 Pac. 395 (1919). Contra: Morris
v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 23 Ga. App. 554, 99 S. E. 133 (1919) ; Lawton v. Charles-
ton & W. C. Ry., 91 S. C. 332, 74 S. E. 750 (1911).
'Colorado Springs & I. Ry. v. Huntling, 66 Colo. 515, 181 Pac. 129 (1919);
Cogswell v. Boston & M. R. R., 78 N. H. 379, 101 Adt. 145 (1917). Accord:
Nygard v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 147 Minn. 109, 179 N. W. 642 (1920); Kowalke
v. Milwaukee Elec. 1. & L. Co., 103 Wis. 472, 79 N. W. 762 (1899) ; see Althoff
v. Torrison, 140 Minn. 8, 11, 167 N. W. 119, 120 (1918) (Where the parties
expressly agree that the release is to apply to unknown as well as known in-juries, the releasor can not avoid the settlement on the ground of mutual mis-
take.) But -see Dolgner v. Dayton Co., 182 Minn. 588, 593, 235 N. W. 275,
277 (1931).
'See 5 WiisroN, CoNTc ers (rev. ed. 1937) 4348.
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leasor's condition to him or there is any inequality of intelligence, edu-
cation, or bargaining power unfavorable to the releasor.
When the court has persuaded itself that the release was intended
to cover known injuries only, the next problem is to determine whether
the mistake was as to fact or a matter of opinion.6 In distinguishing
mistakes of fact and of opinion, the courts define the former as mis-
takes relating to present or past events. In a personal injury case,
such a mistake would relate to the extent of an injury where unknown
conditions exists or to the existence of an independent injury.0 Em-
phasis is placed upon the condition of the releasor which is unrealized
at the time of the settlement. Relief is thus conditioned upon a ne-
gotiation of parties in unconscious ignorance of facts which, if known,
would have influenced the contract. A mistake as to the probable de-
velopment of a known injury with no unknown conditions is a mistake
as to a matter of opinion, for it relates to future uncertain events.10
Thus, when a releasee's physician represents that there will be a re-
covery within a certain period of time, a mistake as to the length of
time, or as to recovery itself if complications arise, is treated as a
matter of opinion.1 Reliance thereon by the releasor will not be suffi-
dent to avoid the release because the parties must have intended to
settle all their conscious uncertainties, which would include matters of
opinion, for they are of the essence of uncertainty.
The injuries suffered by the releasor in the principal case consisted
of shock and severe bruises. His death was caused by heart failure,
a condition which, when considered most favorably to Ps case, "was
hastened or accelerated by the injuries" received through D's negli-
gence. In Richardson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway,'2
a case with similar facts, the releasor had died of Bright's disease con-
8See Tatman v. Philadelphia, B. & W. R. R., 10 Del. Ch. 105, 110, 85 Atl.
716, 718 (Ch. 1913); Poti v. New England Road Mach. Co., 83 N. H. 232,
235, 140 Atl. 587, 589 (1928).
'See Malloy v. Chicago Great Western R. R., 185 Iowa 346, 352, 170 N. W.
481, 483 (1919); Simpson v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., 107 Neb. 779, 782, 186
N. W. 1001, 1003 (1922); Freeman v. Croonm, 172 N. C. 524, 528, 90 S. E.
523, 525 (1916).
'Steele v. Erie Ry., 54 F. (2d) 688 (W. D. N. Y. 1931); Southwest Pump
& Mach. Co. v. Jones, 87 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937); St. Louis-San
Francisco Ry. v. Cauthen, 112 Okla. 256, 241 Pac. 188 (1924); cf. Louisville
& N. Ry. v. Carter, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 2017, 66 S. W. 508 (1902) ; Nelson v. Minne-
apolis St. Ry., 61 Minn. 167, 63 N. W. 486 (1895).
'Lumley v. Wabash Ry., 76 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896); Great Northern
Ry. v. Reid, 245 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917); Lion Oil Ref. Co. v. Albritton,
21 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
" Richardson v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 157 Minn. 474, 196 N. W. 643
(1924); see Simpson v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., 107 Neb. 779, 782, 186 N. W.
1001, 1003 (1922).
"Nelson v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 111 Minn. 193, 126 N. W. 902
(1910); Carroll v. United Rys. of St. Louis, 157 Mo. App. 247, 137 S. W. 303
(1911); Davis v. Higgins, 95 Okla. 32, 217 Pac. 193 (1923).
"157 Minn. 474, 196 N. W. 643 (1924).
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tracted as a consequence of his injuries. The court upheld the release,
treating the evidence as insufficient to warrant rescission, "mistakes
in forecasting such consequences" being considered "mistakes of opin-
ion, not of fact". Both here and in the principal case there was merely
an unanticipated consequence of known injuries, not an unknown in-
jury. In Pass v. McClaren Rubber Company,"3 the North Carolina
court emphasized the fact that, to warrant avoidance of the release for
innocent misrepresentaton, there had to be a clear case of misrepre-
sentation at the time of the settlement as to the releasor's then present
condition resulting from the injuries. In that case, a nerve complica-
tion was discovered subsequent to the releasor's settlement made in
reliance on a representation by releasee's physician that the extent of
his injuries was a simple fracture of the arm. The court did not con-
sider whether, in the light of these facts, an independent unknown in-
jury existed, even though such an inquiry would have been pertinent
to a correct treatment of the case. In denying the releasor's right to
avoid the settlement, the court treated the misrepresentation as an opin-
ion for which the releasot, by "settling before the full extent of his
injury had been ascertained", assumed the risk. These words support
the conclusion that, if mistake were claimed as to a release executed
in conscious ignorance of the facts relating to the releasor's condition,
the release would be treated as an all-inclusive compromise.
In the principal case an independent unknown injury was neither
alleged nor proved. P claimed mutual misapprehension of the parties
as to the extent of deceased's known injuries, but the evidence seems
to prove no more than mistaken opinion as to ultimate recovery. As
there was, then, no ground on which to rescind the release, it should
constitute a bar to the recovery of damages for the releasor's injuries
and death. NATHANIEL G. SIms.
Estates by the Entirety-Creditors' Rights-Deed from
One Spouse to the Other. Liens-Order of Attachment
to After Acquired Property.
In 1927 H and W, husband and wife, acquired and held as tenants
by the entirety a certain tract of land. In 1930 H confessed judgment
in favor of W., which was docketed on October 1 of that year. On
July 17, 1931 W executed and delivered to H a deed which purported
to convey to him all her interest in said tract of land. The acknowledg-
ments and privy examination were duly taken and the deed recorded.
On July 18, 1931 H gave, a deed of trust on the property. This instru-
ment was subsequently foreclosed and the land sold to the plaintiff's
- 198 N. C. 123, 150 S. E. 709 (1929).
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grantor. Thereafter W died and her administrator issued execution on
the judgment for the purpose of selling said land in satisfaction thereof.
Plaintiff then brought this suit to have the judgment declared not a lien
on the land. Held, it is unnecessary to decide whether W could give
H a valid deed to her interest in land held by the entirety because the
judgment was docketed before the deed of trust was recorded and
was therefore a prior lien on the land when acquired by H on the
death of W.1
Although a few cases have held that a judgment is not a lien on
property obtained subsequently thereto, 2 the majority of jurisdictions
hold that a judgment is a lien on such property.3 Most of these latter
courts declare the judgment4 or mortgage5 to be a lien on subsequently
acqkiired property the instant the debtor acquires title. A great ma-
jority of courts, including North Carolina, hold that judgments ac-
quired and docketed at different dates attach simultaneously to after
acquired property and are liens of equal. standing.6 North Carolina
considers property acquired by one tenant by the entirety as a result
of his surviving the other to be after acquired property within the
meaning of the above rule.7 The majority view seems to be the logical
1Keel v. Bailey, 214 N. C. 159, 198 S. E. 654 (1938).
'In re Marcus, 32 F. (2d) 719 (W. D. Pa. 1929) ; Steinfeld v. Copper State
Mining Co:, 37 Ariz. 151, 290 Pac. 155 (1930).
'Porter-Mallard Co. v. Dugger, 117 Fla. 137, 157 So. 429 (1934); Mes-
singer v. Eckenrode, 162 Md. 63, 158 Atl. 357 (1931); Lowe v. Rierson, 201
Minn. 280, 276 N. W. 224 (1937) ; Johannes v. Dwire, 94 Mont. 590, 23 P. (2d)
971 (1933) ; Miller v. Case Threshing Machine Co., 149 Okla. 281, 300 Pac. 399
(1931); Muir v. Bosey, 23 Wyo. 46, 146 Pac. 595 (1915).
'Hertweck v. Hertweck, 180 Cal. 71, 179 Pac. 190 (1919); Isom v. Larsen,
78 Mont. 395, 255 Pac. 1049 (1927); Hulbert v. 'Hulbert, 216 N. Y. 430, 111
N. E. 70 (1916) ; Duke v. Law, 135 Ore. 360, 296 Pac. 45 (1931) ; Baker v.
West, 120 Tex. 113, 36 S. W. (2d) 695 (1931).5Rice v. Kelso, 57 Iowa 115, 7 N. W. 3 (1881).
0Hertweck v. Fearon, 180 Cal. 71, 179 Pac. 190 (1919); In re Hazard's
Estate, 73 Hun. 22, 25 N. Y. Supp. 928 (Sup. Ct. 1893); Hulbert v. Hulbert,
216 N. Y. 430, 111 N. E. 70 (1916) ; Zink v. James River Nat Bank, 58 N. D. 1,
224 N. W. 901 (1929) ; Relfe & Co. v. McComb, 39 Tenn. 558 (1859); Willis
v. Downes, 46 S. W. 920 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898).
By a three to two decision in Moore v. Jordan, 117 N. C. 86, 23 S. E. 259
(1895), the court held that two judgments attach simultaneously to after acquired
property of the judgment debtor regardless of the date of docketing. The po-
sition of the majority was followed without dissent in Johnson v. Leavitt. 188
N. C. 682,. 125 S. E. 490 (1924); Linker v. Linker, 213 N. C. 351, 196 S. E.
329 (1938). The decision in the principal case did not specifically overrule the
above-cited cases.
S"Where several judgments are taken against a husband or a wife indi-
vidually, and at different times, no present lien attaches to property held by
the entirety, but upon the death of either, the survivor acquires the entire legal
title to such property, and the liens of the several judgments held against the
survivor, if still active and unsatisfied, would then attach to said property, eo
instante and at the very moment when the title vests in the judgment debtor
in his or her individual right; hence, the previously taken judgments would all
stand upon the same footing, and the proceeds of a sale thereunder would be
distributed pro rata without reference to the priority of said judgments or to
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result of the holding of a good many courts to the effect that neither
a judgment8 nor a mortgage9 can be a lien on property until the debtor
acquires title. Also, in view of the fact that there can be no reliance
on the record until acquisition of title by the debtor, there seems to be
no good reason for allowing prior recordation of one inchoate lien to
place it ahead of another when neither was a lien at the time of re-
cording and neither holder relied on the record.
Thu3, the holding of the principal case to the effect that prior liens
attach to subsequently acquired property in the chronological order of
recordation seems to be contrary to both the majority view and previous
North Carolina cases. The court in the principal case could have ig-
nored the point on which it based its decision and still have given the
judgment priority by applying either of two more desirable rules; (1)
the rule that a judgment against a husband attaches to his interest
(including his right of survivorship) in property held by the entirety,
or (2) the rule that the interest of one spouse in land held by the
entirety may be directly conveyed to the other so as to give the
grantee title to the whole.
Estates by the entirety are based on the legal fiction that the hus-
band and wife are one person.10 Each has the use of the entire estate,11
and title to the whole remains in the survivor.12 The courts are divided
on the question whether a spouse's interest in such an estate is subject
to execution at the hands of his judgment creditors. 13 The majority
hold that it is not 14 and in most cases even allow the spouses, by joint
conveyance, to vest title in a grantee free and clear of the lien of
judgments docketed against either spouse.15 A numerical minority of
the states allow judgment creditors to execute on an interest of the
the time of their docketing." Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 686, 125 S. E.
490, 492 (1924).
' See note 4, supra. ' See note 5, supra.
"3Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391 (1871) ; Vinton v. Reamer, 55 Mich. 559,
22 N. W. 40 (1885) ; Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 207 S. W.
67 (1918) ; Matter of McKelway, 221 N. Y. 15, 116 N. E. 348 (1917) ; Matter of
Lyon, 233 N. Y. 208, 135 N. E. 247 (1922); McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 39
(1870); McGee v. Henry, 144 Tenn. 548, 234 S. W. 509 (1921).
' See note 10, supra. '3See note 10, supra.
(1931) 11 OR&. L. Ryv. 96.
'Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. Ch. 188, 190 Adt. 418 (Ch. 1920)-; Ohio Butterine
Co. v. Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920); Stifel's Union Brewing Co.
v. Saxy, 273 Mo. 159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918); Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. C.
202, 13 S. E. 790 (1891); Harris v. Carolina Dist. Co., 172 N. C. 14, 89 S. E.
789 (1916) ; Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490 (1924) ; see Davis
v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 205, 124 S. E. 566, 569 (1924). However, in Lewis v.
Pate, 212 N. C. 253, 193 S. E. 20 (1937), the court allowed a judgment creditor
of the husband to execute on the usufruct of lands held by the entirety.
"Johnson vr. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 125 .S. E. 490 (1924); Beihl v. Martin,
236 Pa. 519, 84 Atl. 953 (1912).
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husband in land held by the entirety. 16 Some of these hold that the
only interest he has which is subject to execution is one-half the rents
and profits of the land,' 7 and others allow execution to issue against
his right of survivorship.18 North Carolina, by ruling that a husband
has the right to possession and control of property held by the en-
tirety, allows his judgment creditors to execute on all the rents and
profits of the land for the joint lives of the spouses.' 9
Under the majority view the spouses, by taking title as tenants by
the entirety, are able to put all their real property completely beyond
the reach of their creditors.20 Several of the minority courts deviate
from this only by allowing the judgment creditors to execute on the
usufruct, or part of the usufruct of the land.21 It seems unwise from
a social point of view to permit the spouses to keep their property be-
yond the reach of their creditors. In the principal case. the North
Carolina Court could have reached the same desirable result it did
reach by holding that a judgment against a husband operates as a lien
not only on the u sufruct of land held by the entirety but also on the
husband's right of suvivorship in such property. This would have
made the judgment a lien on this right from the time of docketing, and
it would, therefore, have been ahead of the subsequent deed of trust.
However, such a rule as we have advocated would involve the over-
ruling of previous North Carolina decisions.22
A minority of jurisdictions held that a husband's deed to himself
and his wife operates to make them tenants by the entirety of the
property conveyed.23 The obvious explanation for this view is that
the conveyance is regarded as being made by the husband to a separate
fictitious person, husband and wife.24 It has been suggested that the
majority holding, which denies such effect to the deed,25 is not entirely
consistent with the theory on which tenancies by the entirety are
based, namely that husband and wife are a separate legal entity.20 In
" Moore v. Denson, 167 Ark. 134, 269 S. W. 609 (1924); Ganoe v. Ohmart,
121 Ore. 116, 254 Pac: 203 (1927); J. A. Steinberg Co. v. Pastive, 97 N. J. Eq.
52, 129 AtI. 201 (Ch. 1925).
'Moore v. Denson, 167 Ark. 134, 269 S. W. 609 (1924); Ganoe v. Ohmart,
121 Ore. 116, 254 Pac. 203 (1927).
' J. A. Steinberg Co. v. Pastive, 97 N. J. Eq. 52, 129 Atl. 201 (Ch. 1925).
" Lewis v. Pate, 212 N. C. 253, 193 S. E. 20 (1937).
1 (1931) 29 MicH. L. REv. 788, 789. ' 1See notes 17 and 19, stp ra.
'Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. C. 202, 13 S. E. 790 (1891) ; Johnson v. Leavitt,
188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490 (1924); see Davis v. Bass, 188 N. C. 200, 205,
124 S. E. 566, 569 (1924).
'In re Klatzl's Estate, 149 N. Y. Supp. 794 (Surr. Ct. 1914) ; In re Vogel-
sang's Estate, 122 Misc. 599, 203 N. Y. Supp. 364 (Surr. Ct. 1924) ; Boehringer
v. Schmid, 133 Misc. 236, 232 N. Y. Supp. 360 (Sup. Ct 1928); (1929) 9
B. U. L. REv. 134. - (1929) 9 B. U. L. Rav. 134, 137.
'Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929); P6gg v. Pegg,
165 Mich. 228, 130 N. W. 617 (1911) ; Michigan State Bank v. Kern, 189 Mich.
467, 155 N. W. 502 (1915). - (1929) 9 B. U. L. Rzy. 134, 137.
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some states the decisions permit the husband to transfer his interest
in an estate held by the entirety to a third person who becomes a
tenant in common with the wife for the joint lives of the spouses.27
Still other jurisdictions hold that the husband's deed to the wife of
his interest in an estate held by the entirety is valid to vest title to
the whole in the wife.28 The principal objection to this holding is that
it results in a* violation of the unity of person theory. However, in
view of the fact that this theory has already been the recipient of con-
siderable violence, as shown by the above examples,29 there seems to be
no good reason for allowing it either to invalidate otherwise valid con-
veyances between the spouses, or force them to pursue a more cir-
cuitous route in order to transfer the interest of one to the other. By
the formality of both conveying to a third person and having him con-
vey back to one spouse, the desired result can be accomplished.30 It
could have been reached in the principal case by holding that the wife's
deed vested title to the whole in the husband. The judgment would
then have attached immediately and the deed of trust would have been
subsequent thereto. However, this, the most justifiable basis upon
which the North Carolina Court could have predicated its decision in
giving the judgment priority, was cast aside as being immaterial. As
a consequence the court ran counter to its own previous decisions re-
garding the attachment of liens to subsequently acquired property.3 '
J. NATHANIEL HAMRICK.
Evidence-Substantive Use of Character Evidence in Civil Actions
in North Carolina-How Character May Be Proved.
In an action for damages for alienation of affections and criminal
conversation, a witness for the plaintiff was allowed to testify that he
had arrested the defendant for the commission of a misdemeanor. An-
other witness, the county recorder, was allowed to testify that the de-
fendant had been tried in his court. Held, the trial court did not err
in admitting this testimony. The witnesses had already testified as to
the defendant's mental capacity, which was material on the issue of
his liability for punitive damages. The evidence objected to was rele-
vant to show the opportunities the witnesses had had to observe the
defendant and form an opinion of his mental capacity, and the trial
Schulz v. Zeigler, 80 N. J. Eq. 199, 83 Atl. 968 (1912); Zubler v. Porter,
98 N. J. Law 444, 120 AtI. 194 (1923).
'Meeker v. Wright, 76 N. Y. 262 (1879); Mart v. Scarmach, 65 Misc.
124, 119 N. Y. Supp. 449 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
'See notes 27 and 28, supra.
' Porobenski v. American Alliance Ins. Co., 317 Pa. 410, 176 At. 205 (1935),
"Moore v. Jordan, 117 N. C. 86, 23 S. E. 259 (1895); Johnson v. Leavitt,
188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490 (1924); Linker v. Linker, 213 N. C. 351, 196 S. E.
329 (1938).
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court carefully instructed the jury to restrict its consideration of the
testimony accordingly.-
It is an almost universally accepted rule that evidence of character
is inadmissible in civil actions for substantive purposes,2 unless char-
acter is an issue in the particular case.3 This general rule has been
adopted and followed by the North Carolina courts, which have ex-
cluded evidence of the character, both of the parties to an action and
of third persons, 4 unless "character is put directly in issue by the na-
ture of the proceedings." 5 Two reasons have been advanced for the
rule: (1) character evidence is ordinarily irrelevant to any of the is-
sues in a civil action;6 and (2) such evidence tends to confuse and
mislead the jury as to what the issues in the case really are.7
The statement that character evidence is ordinarily "irrelevant" in
a civil action is often confusing. The argument that "a very bad man
may have a very righteous cause" s is obvious, but it is also obvious that
a man of bad character is more apt to commit certain kinds of acts
than a man of good character. Hence, if the doing of such an act is
in issue in a civil action, evidence of the alleged doer's character should
have some relevancy. The statement that character evidence is irrele-
vant, then, may mean that no act of that kind is in issue in the average
civil action, or it may mean that, even if there is such an issue, the
probative value of character evidence is so slight that it is outweighed
by the second reason for the rule-that such evidence tends to confuse
and mislead the jury. Both reasons may be questionable in some cases
in which the rule is applied, at least by comparison with criminal ac-
tions in which such evidence is more freely admitted.
Another source of confusion in the decisions is the frequent use
of the words "character" and "reputation" synonymously. A person's
"character" is an actual quality possessed by him; his "reputation" is
what others estimate his character to be.9 A probable explanation of
this confusion will appear from the ensuing discussion.
'Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N. C. 191, 198 S. E. 619 (1938).No attempt will be made in this note to discuss evidence of character for
the purpose of impeaching witnesses.
, 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENcE (2d ed. 1923) §§64(4), 70-80.
,'Heileg v. Dumas, 65 N. C. 214 (1871) ; Braswell v. Gay, 75 N. C. 515 (1876).
'McRae v. Lilly, 23 N. C. 118 (1840) ; Beal v. Robeson, 30 N. C. 276 (1848) ;
Bottoms v. Kent, 48 N. C. 154 (1855); Norris v. Stewart, 105 N. C. 455, 10
S. E. 912 (1890); Marcom v. Adams, 122 N. C. 222, 29 S. E. 333 (1898);
Wilson Lumber & Milling Co. v. Atkinson, 162 N. C. 298, 78 S. E. 212 (1913) ;
Merrill v. Tew, 183 N. C. 172, 110 S. E. 850 (1922).
6 Bottoms v. Kent, 48 N. C. 154 (1855); Clements v. Rogers, 95 N. C. 248
(1886) ; Sigmon v. Shell, 165 N. C. 582, 81 S. E. 739 (1914).
'Clements v. Rogers, 95 N. C. 248 (1886). A third reason whichbhas some-
times been given for excluding character evidence is that it- is extremely un-
reliable because of a natural reluctance to disparage. one's neighbor openly.
(1935) 13 Tax. L. REy. 531.
RThompson v. Church, 1 Root 312 (Conn. 1791).9 For a discussion of this distinction, see State v. Ussery, 118 N. C. 1177, 24
S. E. 414 (1896).
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The North Carolina, Supreme Court has followed the general rule
excluding evidence of character for substantive purposes in civil suits,
although opinions might differ as to the consistency of its application.
In McRae v. Lilly,'0 an action for damages for the seduction of the
plaintiff's daughter, the defendant introduced evidence to show that
the plaintiff consented to the seduction. The plaintiff then offered to
prove, in rebuttal, that he was a man of good character and "of a mod-
est and retiring disposition", but the trial court refused the offer, and
this ruling was affirmed on appeal. The evidence offered was clearly
for the purpose of proving character, not reputation, and might well
have been considered relevant. In Beal v. Robeson,1 an action for
malicious prosecution, the plaintiffs attempted to prove that the assault
and robbery for which the defendant had caused them to be indicted
had never occurred, but that the defendant had merely gotten drunk,
fallen from his horse, and hit his head upon a rock. The Supreme Court
reversed the ruling of the trial court admitting evidence to show that
the defendant "bore the character of being a sober man". Here the
word character is used when reputation is evidently referred to,
and again the evidence seems relevant, as judged by the standard of
criminal cases. Likewise, the Court has repeatedly upheld the exclu-
sion of character evidence, in civil suits, on the issues of undue in-
fluence, 12 fraud, 1 usury,14 and breach of contract.15
Where "character is put directly in issue by the nature of the pro-
ceedings", character evidence is admissible. "'Putting character in is-
sue' ", according to the opinion in Norris v. Stewart, "'is a technical ex-
pression, and confined to-certain actions, from the nature of which the
character of the parties is of particular importance' ,,.16 The difficulty of
applying the standard is apparent, both from the form of the statement,
and from a comparison of the examples to follow with those given
above. Specifically, under the North Carolina decisions, character is in
issue in actions for wrongful death, where the character of the deceased
is material in determining what his earnings would have been had he
lived, such earnings being the basis for estimating damages ;17 in actions
" 23 N. C. 118 (1840). -30 N. C. 276 (1848).
"Bottoms v. Kent, 48 N. C. 154 (1855); In re McKay, 183 N. C. 226, 111
S. E. 5 (1922).
Clements v. Rogers, 95 N. C. 248 (1886); Norris v. Stewart, 105 N. C.
455, 10 S. E. 912 (1890); Wilson Lumber & Milling Co. v. Atkinson, 162 N. C.
298, 78 S. E. 212 (1913). "Cox v. Brookside, 76 N. C. 314 (1877).
' Merrill v. Tew, 183 N. C. 172, 110 S. E. 850 (1922).
- 105 N. C. 455, 458, 10 S. E. 912, 913 (1890), quoting Tilghman, C. J. in
Anderson v. Long, 10 S. & R. 54, 61 (Pa. 1823). This may mean that character
is in issue when relevant to an ultimate issue in the case, as distinguished from
an evidentiary issue, but the cases do not seem to substantiate this.
" Kessler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154 (1872); Bradley v. Ohio R. & C. R. R.,
122 N. C. 972, 30 S. E. 8 (1898); Burns v. Ashboro & M. R. R., 125 N. C.
304, 34 S. E. 495 (1899) ; Poe v. Raleigh & A. A. L. R .R., 141 N. C. 525, 54
S. E. 406 (1906); 'Hancock v. Wilson, 211 N. C. 129, 189 S. E. 631 (1936).
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for slander, where the plaintiff's character is material on the issue of
damages, since damages are determined by the amount of injury done
to that character' s (reputation is what is meant here, for obviously
slander does not injure character), and on the issue of truth, if
truth is pleaded as a defense, where the alleged slander charged the
plaintiff with the commission of a criminal offense;19 in actions for
damages for breach of contract to marry, because the character of the
plaintiff is material on the issue of whether or not the defendant should
be excused from performance on the ground that the plaintiff is un-
chaste ;20 in actions to recover damages for seduction, as the character
(or, preferably, the reputation) of the plaintiff and the plaintiff's fam-
ily is material on the question of the degree of agony and suffering in-
flicted upon them by the seduction, such agony and suffering being the
basis for estimating damages ;21 and, finally, in actions for separation
and permanent allowance without divorce, under a statute which pro-
vides that these may be awarded where the husband is a drunkard or
a spendthrift, separates himself from his wife and fails to provide for
her according to his means and condition in life, or is guilty of any
misconduct which would constitute grounds for divorce. 22
If proof of character is allowed in a particular action,23 the question
then arises as to how character may be proved.2 4  Since the character
of an individual is an intangible quality which is impossible of deter-
mination through the media of the five senses, it can never be ascer-
tained with absolute certainty, but is only subject to conjecture. An
opinion as to what a person's character- is must be based upon circum-
stantial evidence in the form of the conduct of the individual. The
aggregate of the opinions formed by persons acquainted with his con-
duct constitutes the general reputation of the individual. Character,
then, might be evinced by: (1) particular acts of conduct; (2) indi-
vidual opinions based upon such conduct; and (3) general reputation. 25
"Vick v. Whitfield, 3 N. C. 222 (1802); Sample v. Wynn, 44 N. C. 319(1853) ; see Goodbread v. Ledbetter, 18 N. C. 12, 13 (1834).
"Burton v. March, 51 N. C. 409 (1859); McDougald v. Coward, 95 N. C.
368 (1886).
"Gaskill v. Dixon, 3 N. C. 350 (1805).
'McCauley v. Birkhead, 35 N. C. 28 (1851).
1Rodman v. Rodman, 198 N. C. 137, 150 S. E. 874 (1929). In this case
both parties were allowed to introduce evidence tending to prove their character,
and the plaintiff further showed that the defendant had a reputation for "being
mean to his wife". While this evidence does tend to prove conduct which the
statute sets forth as grounds for recovery, it does not seem that character should
be in issue in this type of action any more than it is in actions for fraud or
undue influence.
'For a discussion of the admissibility of character evidence in criminal
cases in North Carolina, see note (1924) 2 N. C. L. REv. 170.
' While most of the rules governing the methods of proving character in
North Carolina have been set forth in criminal cases, there is no apparent reason
why the same rules would not apply in civil cases.See 1 WiGmoRE, EvmIcE §§52, 53, 193, 202.
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Evidence of specific acts of conduct, while it does in fact tend to
prove character, is rarely admitted for that purpose because: (1) the
fact that an individual has committed one or two particular acts does
not necessarily prove character ;26 (2) such evidence tends to confuse
and mislead the jury by raising collateral issues ;27 (3) an individual
would experience little difficulty in procuring evidence to defend him-
self against perjured testimony concerning his general reputation, but
it would be practically impossible, on short notice, to obtain witnesses
who could rebut perjured testimony as to the commission of a particu-
lar act alleged to have been committed at any time in the course of an
entire lifetime ;28 (4) the jury may believe that the person whose char-
acter is in issue committed the act on which the litigation centers
simply because he is a person likely to commit such an act, without
taking into consideration any other circumstances shown ;29 and (5)
if the person whose character is being proved is a party to the action,
there is a high degree of danger that the jury will penalize him for
the acts shown in proving character, whether he committed the act
with which the litigation is concerned or not.30 And, since evidence of
specific acts is inadmissible, evidence of a report or rumor concerning
a specific act is likewise inadmissible.3 '
An exception to the rule excluding proof of specific acts is usually
made in prosecutions for seduction where the chastity of the seducee
is a necessary element, for the obvious reason that a single act destroys
chastity. 2 And, in like manner, evidence showing that the prosecutrix
had never committed an act which would destroy her chastity is ad-
missible.33
The second method by which character might be proved-personal
opinions of those who know the individual whose character is in issue-
is excluded by the opinion rule.3 4
Nixon v. McKinney, 105 N. C. 23, 11 S. E. 154; Tillotson v. Currin. 176
N. C. 479, 97 S. E. 395 (1918) ; Hill v. Hill, 196 N. C. 472, 146 S. E. 138 (1928).
' State v. Laxton, 76 N. C. 216 (1877) ; State v. Bullard. 100 N. C. 486. 6
S. E. 191 (1888); Nixon v. McKinney, 105 N. C. 23, 11 S. E. 154 (1890);
State v. Austin, 108 N. C. 780, 13 S. E. 219 (1891) ; State v. Holly; 155 N. C.
485, 71 S. E. 450 (1911); Tillotson v. Currin, 176 N. C. 479, 97 S. E. 395(1918); Hill v. Hill, 196 N. C. 472, 146 S. E. 138 (1928).
' State v. Bullard, 100 N. C. 486, 6 S. E. 191 (1888) ; Nixon v. McKinney,
105 N. C. 23, 11 S. E. 154 (1890); State v. Holly, 155 N. C. 485, 71 S. E. 450
(1911); Tillotson v. Currin, 176 N. C. 479, 97 S. E. 395 (1918); Hill v. Hill,
196 N. C. 472, 146 S. E. 138 (1928). ' 1 WGMoRE, EVIDENCE §194(2).
'Ibid. This reason is especially applicable to criminal cases, but not in-
applicable to civil cases.
"Luther v. Skeen, 53 N. C. 356 (1861); State v. Laxton, 76 N. C. 216
(1877) ; State v. Austin, 108 N. C. 780, 13 S. E. 219 (1891); Marcom v. Adams,
122 N. C." 222, 29 S. E. 333 (1898) ; State v. Mitchell, 156 N. C. 653, 72 S. E.
792 (1911) ; State v. McLawhorn, 195 N. C. 327, 141 S. E. 883 (1928).
' 1 WIGMORE, EVMENCE §205.
'State v' Fulcher, 176 N. C. 724, 97 S. E. 2 (1918).
"4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§1980 et seq. (where the rule is criticized) ; Bottoms
v. Kent, 48 N. C. 154 (1855).
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By the process of elimination, then, the only way in which char-
acter may ordinarily be proved is by evidence of general reputation.
And this, no doubt, accounts for the confusion between character
and reputation mentioned above. The North Carolina decisions have
clearly set forth the steps to be followed in giving such evidence. Be-
fore a witness may testify as to the character of a person, he must first
be asked if he knows that person's general reputation. 5 If he gives a
negative answer, he can be questioned no further on the subject.86 If
he says he does know the person's general reputation, he may then be
asked what that reputation is as to general character, and only as to
general character.8 7  Any testimony which he then gives must be con-
fined to the individual's reputation among members of the community
in which he resides,3 and not among members of a particular group
within the community ;39 and it must be confined to the reputation the
individual bore at the time of, or before (but not too long before),40
the commission of the act in question.41 But, although the witness may
be questioned only as to reputation for general character on direct ex-
amination, he may voluntarily qualify his testimony by stating what the
individual's reputation is for particular traits.42 And, for the purpose
of testing his knowledge, he may be asked on cross-examination in
what respects the reputation is good or bad,43 and from what source
' State v. Coley, 114 N. C. 879, 19 S. E. 705 (1894); State v. Ussery,
118 N. C. 1177, 24 S. E. 414 (1896); State v. Mills, 184 N. C. 694, 114 S. E.
314 (1922) ; State v. Nance, 195 N. C. 47, 141 S. E. 468 (1927).
State v. Wheeler, 104 N. C. 894, 10 S. E. 518 (1889).
' State v. 'Hice, 117 N. C. 782, 23 S. E. 357 (1895) ; State v. Hairston, 121
N. C. 579, 28 S. E. 492 (1897); State v. Thornton, 136 N. C. 610, 48 S. E.
602 (1904); State v. Wilson, 158 N. C. 599, 73 S. E. 812 (1912); State v.
Morse, 171 N. C. 777, 87 S. E. 946 (1916); State v. McKinney, 175 N. C.
784, 95 S. E. 162 (1918); State v. Lovelace, 178 N. C. 762, 101 S. E, 380
(1919); State v. O'Neal, 187 N. C. 22, 120 S. E. 817 (1923) ; State v. Nance,
195 N. C. 47, 141 S. E. 468 (1927); see State v. Pearson, 181 N. C. 588, 589,
107 S. E. 305 (1921).
'State v. Smoak, 213 N. C. 79, 195 S. E. 72 (1937); cf. State v. Gee, 92
N. C. 756 (1885) (general repute among his associates).
' State v. Hodgin, 210 N. C. 371, 186 S. E. 495 (1936) ; State v. Smoak, 213 N.
C. 79, 195 S. E. 72 (1937). Contra: State v. Malonee, 154 N. C. 200, 69 S. E.
786 (1910) (evidence of reputation among teachers and schoolmates admitted).
40State v. Patrick, 204 N. C. 299, 168 S. E. 202 (1933) (reputation of prose-
cutrix almost two years prior to time of alleged seduction inadmissible).
IState v. Johnson, 60 N. C. 151 (1863) ; State v. Holly, 155 N. C. 485, 71
S. E. 450 (1911).
'State v. Hairston, 121 N. C. 579, 28 S. E. 492 (1897); State v. Wilson,
158 N. C. 599. 73 S. E. 812 (1912) ; State v. Walker, 173 N. C. 775, 92 S. E.
328 (1917); State v. Butler, 177 N. C. 585, 98 S. E. 821 (1919) ; State v.
Reagan, 185 N. C. 710, 117 S. E. 1 (1923); State v. O'Neal, 187 N. C. 22,
120 S. E. 817 (1923) ; State v. Fleming, 194 N. C. 42, 138 S. E. 342 (1927) ;
State v. Nance. 195 N. C. 47, 141 S. E. 468 (1927) ; State v. McLawhorn,
195 N. C. 327, 141 S. E. 883 (1928).
'State v. Ussery, 118 N . C. 1177, 24 S. E. 414 (1896) : State v. Hairston.
121 N. C. 579, 28 S. E. 492 (1897); State v. Wilson, 158 N. C. 599, 73 S. E.
812 (1912) ; State v. Nance, 195 N. C. 47, 141 S. R. 468 (1927).
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he acquired his knowledge concerning it.44  The redirect examination
is then limited to the particular matters brought out on cross-examina-
tion.
45
Where evidence of a particular character trait is admissible, the
North Carolina Supreme Court has allowed evidence of an individual's
reputation for having followed a particular course of conduct, appar-
ently on the assumption that such a course of conduct is, or is evidence
of, a character trait. Thus it may be.shown that the person whose
character is in question has a reputation for having engaged in activities
such as selling liquor46 or prostitution.47 It is difficult to see how such
lines of activity can be called character "traits", but they may indicate
a propensity for lawlessness. Evidence of a course of conduct, there-
fore, should be admitted, for it has a greater tendency to prove char-
acter than does evidence of isolated acts; it is less likely to confuse the
issues and mislead the jury; and, if false, it is easier to rebut than
is evidence of particular acts.
The evidence in the principal case was admitted technically for
the purpose of showing the opportunities of the witnesses to observe
the defendant. As a practical matter, however, the average juryman
would be far more affected by its tendency to prove the defendant's
bad character, particularly where the defendant is charged with criminal
conversation and alienation of affections. And, as character evidence,
it would clearly be inadmissible under the rules discussed, because
character was not in issue in the case, and because it was evidence of
a particular act, proved only by the fact that he had been arrested and
tried for such act. While the great weight of authority holds that
evidence, admissible for one purpose, is not to be excluded simply be-
cause it would be inadmissible if offered for another purpose,4 8 it
would seem preferable to exclude it for all purposes where the probable
prejudice engendered thereby in the minds of the jury is so great as to
overcome its value for the purpose for which it is admissible.49
JAMEs D. CARR.
"State v. Austin, 108 N. C. 780, 13 S. E. 219 (1891) ; State v. Holly, 155
N. C. 485, 71 S. E. 450 (1911).
"State v. Ussery, 118 N. C. 1177, 24 S. E. 414 (1896).
"State v. Cathey, 170 N. C. 794, 87 S. E. 532 (1915); State v. Atwood,
176 N. C. 704, 97 S. E. 12 (1918) ; State v. Butler, 177 N. C. 585, 98 S. E. 821(1919) ; State v. Mills, 184 N. C. 694, 114 S. E. 314 (1922) ; State v. Reagan,
185 N. C. 710, 117 S. E. 1 (1923); State v. Fleming, 194 N. C. 42, 138 S. E.
342 (1927); State v. McLawhorn, 195 N. C. 327, 141 S. E. 883 (1928); cf.
State v. O'Neal, 187 N. C. 22, 120 S. E. 817 (1923) (testimony concerning
the defendant's "activities . . . trying to destroy the liquor business" excluded
on the grounds that evidence of specific acts is inadmissible for purpose of
proving character).4TState v. Wilson, 158 N. C. 599, 73 S. E. 812 (1912).
'1 WIGMORU, EVIDENCE §§12, 215.
'See Cardozo, J., in Shepard v. United States, 290 U. S. 96, 54 Sup. Ct.
22, 78 L. ed. 196 (1933).
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Executors and Administrators-Duty to Plead
Statute of Limitations.
It is well recognized that on the death of a debtor the right to use
the bar of the Statute of Limitations passes immediately to his per-
sonal representative acting as executor or administrator of the estate.
The granting of this right of the decedent to the personal representative
was evolved at an early date in England' and has been adopted as the
law of this country. The question arises whether in acting for the
estate he is likewise allowed the same discretion in waiving and tolling
the Statute that the debtor himself enjoyed.
There is diversity of opinion as to whether the personal representa-
tive must plead the Statute of Limitations upon his own initiative when-
ever the remedy is available or stand personally liable for his failure
to do so. 2 Theoretically, he stands in the shoes of the decedent and,
therefore, it is his duty to pay all debts and clear the estate as the de-
cedent would be presumed to have done. When the executor or ad-
ministrator conscientiously feels that the claim presented is just and
well founded or when the deceased contemplated and expressed a wish
that the payment of the claim be made, it may be argued that the per-
sonal representative should not cause the deceased to "sin in his grave" 3
by pleading the Statute of Limitations. An argument to the contrary
is that the personal representative is expected to protect the interests
of the heirs, distributees, devisees, or legatees and promote their wel-
fare by using every method available to preserve as large an estate as
possible for them. Likewise, it may be urged that the duty of pro-
tecting bond fide creditors not barred by the Statute of Limitations
falls upon the personal representative and that he must assure them
114 HALSBURY, THE LAws oF ENGLAND (1910) §330.
2The majority view that the personal representative is under no duty to
plead the Statute of Limitations is upheld by the following jurisdictions: Mc-
Donald v. Carnes, 90 Ala. 147, 7 So. 919 (1890) ; Scott v. Penn, 68 Ark. 492,
60 S. W. 235 (1900); Baker v. Bush, 25 Ga. 594 (1858); Trimball v. Marshall,
66 Iowa 233, 23 N. W. 645 (1885); Slattery v. Doyle, 180 Mass. 27, 61 N. E.
264 (1901); Hodgdon v. White, 11 N. H. 208 (1840); McNair v. Cooper,
174 N. C. 566, 94 S. E. 98 (1919); In re Claghorn's Estate, 181 Pa. 600. 37
Atl: 918 (1897). Contra: Dern v. Olsen, 18 Idaho 358, 110 Pac. 164 (1910):
Clawson v. McCune, 20 Kan. 337 (1878); McGee v. Atkinson; 66 Mich. 628.
33 N. W. 737 (1887); Trotter v. Trotter, 40 Miss. 704 (1866); Jackson v.
Stone, 155 S. W. 960 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). In some states the personal
representative's duty is determined by statute. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. (Deering,
1937) §708 (which makes it the duty of the personal representative to plead
the Statute of Limitations); MD. ANN. CoDE (Flack, Supp. 1935) art. 93, §100
(personal representative given discretionary power in pleading the Statute).
Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina follow a unique rule allowing the personal
representative to waive the Statute of Limitations as to a debt barred during
the lifetime of the debtor but making it his duty- to plead the Statute as to
a debt becoming barred after his death. Deans v. Wilcoxan, 25 Fla. 980, 7
So. 163 (1889) ;.Crabtree v. Graham, 81 Ga. 290, 6 S. E. 426 (1888); Gibson
v. Lowndes, 28 S. C. 285, 5 S. E. 727 (1887).
"See Halliburton v. Carson, 100 N. C. 99, 107, 5 S. E. 912, 914 (1888).
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full and prompt payment, unprejudiced by any barred claims, the pay-
ment of which might result in serious depletion of the assets. These
conflicting obligations of the personal representative to the decedent
and to persons interested in his estate tend to explain the diversity of
opinion as to his duty.
The North Carolina Statute of Limitations was first construed in
1797 to allow the personal representative to waive the Statute at his
discretion as the decedent might have done. 4  This construction was
followed5 until 1891 when a statute6 imposed the absolute duty to plead
the Statute of Limitations in all cases in which the plea might be
available, but two years later that statute was repealed, 7 and the law
was restored to its former status. Parallel with the cases developing
the law with respect to the duties of the personal representative as to
claims barred by the Statute of Limitations, was a line of cases8 con-
cerned with his duties in regard to the payment of claims of such a
nature as to fall within the common law presumption 9 of payment or
the ten year Statute of Presumptions10 applicable to sealed instruments.;
These claims, as a result of the elapse of the necessary number of years,
were presumed to have been paid, but the presumption could be re-
butted.:1 Some of the early North Carolina decisions indicated that
although the personal representative would not be liable for not in-
voking the Statute of Limitations against these claims, he would be
liable for paying them without invoking the presumptions unless he
could affirmatively prove that the debts had not been paid.' 2 The
'See Cobham v. Administrators, 3 N. C. 6, 7 (1797). The Statutes of
Limitations then in force were: Laws of N. C. 1715, c. 48, §7; Laws of N. C.
1789, c.23, §2.
'Leigh v. Smith, 38 N. C. 442 (1844); Barnawell v. Smith, 58 N. C. 168
(1859) ; Halliburton v. Carson, 100 N. C. 99, 5 S. E. 912 (1888); see Williams
v. Maitland, 36 N. C. 93, 101 (1840).
N. C. Pub. Laws 1891, c. 92.
N. C. Pub. Laws 1893, c. 7.8Williams v. Maitland, 36 N. C. 93 (1840); Barnawell v. Smith, 58 N. C.
168 (1859) ; Halliburton v. Carson, 100 N. C. 99, 5 S. E. 912 (1888).
' The common law presumption of the payment of an outstanding debt arose
after a period of twenty. years. See M'Culloch v. Dawes, 9 Dow. & Ry. 40
(K. B. 1826) ; Williams v. Maitland, 36 N. C. 93, 101 (1840).
"0 Laws of N. C. 1826, c. 65, §18.
"See Barnawell v. Smith, 58 N. C. 168, 172 (1859).
See Williams v. Maitland, 36 N. C. 93, 101 (1840); Barnawell v. Smith,
58 N. C. 168, 172 (1859); Halliburton v. Carson, 100 N. C. 99, 107, 5 S. E.
912, 914 (1888). In the Barnawell case the court said at p. 171: "We do not
doubt that an executor or an administrator has a discretion whether he will
plead the ordinary statute of limitations to a claim against the estate of his
testator or intestate, and that if he is satisfied that the claim is just, he is
not bound to plead the statute in a suit against him at law. But we think the
case is different where the alleged claim or debt is so old and stale, that the
common or statutory law raises a presumption, of its having been paid, from
the lapse of time. In such a case, the administrator, before he pays such a claim,
ought to show that the presumption was untrue, and that it had not, in fact, been
paid or satisfied. .. ."
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Statute of Presumptions is no longer in effect in North Carolina. 18
Whether the common law presumption has been superseded by the com-
prehensive provisions of the modern Statutes of Limitations is not
altogether dear. If it has not, personal representatives should be wary
about paying claims barred by the Statute which are also sufficiently
old to fall within the presumption.
The present law in North Carolina, as was the case before 1891,
allows the personal representative to exercise his own discretion in
asserting the Statute of Limitations as a defense to claims presented
by creditors,' 4 one qualification being that if he pays a barred claim
he must act in perfect good faith.1 5 Nor is he under any duty to
plead the Statute in the absence of fraud or collusion when an action
is brought against the estate by a creditor.' 6 Where fraud, collusion,
or bad faith is proved against him, he must personally bear the losses
caused to the estate by his failure to take advantage of the Statute
of Limitations,' 7 but mere failure to plead the Statute does not of
-itself constitute collusive fraud.' 8  There is no indication in the North
Carolina cases that the personal representative's discretion in invoking
the Statute of Limitations is not broad enough to permit him to sat-
isfy his own personal claim against the estate after the statutory period
has run. However, failure to assert the Statute might create a sus-
picion of bad faith.
This discretionary power of waiver vested in the personal repre-
sentative can not be taken away by any action of the heirs, distributees,
devisees, or legatees.19 They are bound by his waiver in the absence
of fraud and they cannot force him to use the defense even though their
own interests are at stake.20 It has .further been held in Alabama that
Is It has been replaced by a ten year Statute of Limitations on seated instru-
ments. N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §437. See Helm Co. v. Griffin, 112
N. C. 356, 358, 16 S. E. 1023, 1024 (1893); Brown v. Harding, 171 N. C. 686,
689, 89 S. E. 222, 224 (1916).
"Person v. Montgomery, 120 N. C. 111, 26 S. E. 645 (1897) ; Best v. Best,
161 N. C. 513, 77 S. E. 762 (1913); McNair v. Cooper, 174 N. C. 566, 94 S. E.
98 (1917) ; Twiddy v. Mullen, 176 N. C. 16, 96 S. E. 653 (1918) ; Coleman v.
Van, 205 N. C. 436, 171 S. E. 639 (1933).
"Leigh v. Smith, 38 N. C. 442 (1844).
11 Speer v. James, 94 N. C. 417 (1886); Lee v. McKoy, 118 N. C. 518, 24
S. E. 210 (1896); Person v. Montgomery, 120 N. C. 111, 26 S. E. 654 (1897);
Hinton v. Pritchard, 126 N. C. 8, 35 S. E. 127 (1900); Best v. Best, 161 N.
C. 513, 77 S. E. 762 (1913); McNair v. Cooper, 174 N. C. 566, 94 S. E. 98
(1917) ; Twiddy v. Mullen, 176 N. C. 16, 96 S. E. 653 (1918); Coleman v. Van,
205 N. C. 436, 171 S. E. 639 (1933).
Person v. Montgomery, 120 N. C. 111, 26 S. E. 645 (1897); Twiddy v.
Mullen, 176 N. C. 16, 96 S. E. 653 (1918).
'Best v. Best, 161 N. C. 513, 77 S. E. 762 (1913).
'Speer v. James, 94 N. C. 417 (1886); Lee v. McKoy, 118 N. C. 518,
24 S. E. 210 (1896); Hinton v. Pritchard, 126 N. C. 8, 35 S. E. 127 (1900);
Mathews v. Peterson, 150 N. C. 134, 63 S. E. 721 (1909).
0Speer v. James, 94 N. C. 417 (1886); Lee v. McKoy, 118 N. C. 518, 24
S. E. 210 (1896); Hinton v. Pritchard, 126 N. C. 8, 35 S. E. 127 (1900);
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these persons cannot on motion be made parties to a cause of action
for the purpose of interposing the plea.21 If the personal representa-
tive has waived his right to plead the Statute of Limitations and a
judgment is rendered against him, such judgment will ordinarily be
conclusive upon those who claim under the estate. When the adminis-
trator or executor petitions the court for permission to sell land, the
heirs or devisees are made defendants, but they have no power to
restrain the sale merely by pleading that the claim to be paid from the
proceeds of the sale was barred by the Statute of Limitations when the
original action on it was brought against the executor or administra-
tor.2 2 They may independently set up the Statute, but they can suc-
ceed only by proving that the judgment was rendered as a result of
fraud and -collusion or gross negligence on the part of the personal
representative.23  Where a creditor, having delayed filing his claim
until after the assets have been distributed, seeks to recover from the
distributees or legatees, presumably they may plead the Statute of
Limitations, 24 although there is no case authority in point in North
Carolina.
If an estate is insolvent, it may well be contended that creditors
whose claims are not barred by the Statute of Limitations are entitled
to have that defense urged against creditors whose claims are barred.
Otherwise the pro rata share of the creditor whose claim is not barred
may be materially reduced. In bankruptcy, this danger is recognized
and guarded against. It.is the duty of the trustee to plead the Statute
of Limitations.2 5 In the administration of insolvent deceased debtors'
estates in North Carolina, apparently no exception is made to the gen-
eral rule that it is within the discretion of the personal representative
to assert the defense. But there is a method by which creditors may
protect themselves. They may protect their inchoate interest in the
assets of the estate by a creditor's bill2 or by a creditor's special pro-
Mathews v. Peterson, 150 N. C. 134, 63 S. E. 712 (1909). Contra: Syme v.
Badger, 96 N. C. 197 (1897) (holding that realty was protected unless the ac-
tion against the heirs was completed within the statutory period), overruled by
Lee v. McKoy, supra.
"'Ex parte Perryman, 25 Ala. 79 (1854).
' Best v. Best, 161 N. C. 513, 77 S. E. 762 (1913); Coleman v. Van, 205
N. C. 436, 171 S. E. 639 (1933).
' Smith v. Brown, 101 N. C. 347, 7 S. E. 890 (1888); McNair v. Cooper,
174 N. C. 566, 94 S. E. 98 (1917) ; Twiddy v. Mullen, 176 N. C. 16, 96 S. E. 653
(1918).2' Converse v. Nichols, 212 Mass. 270, 89 N. E. 135 (1909); Beekman v.
Richardson, 150 Mo. 430, 51 S. W. 689 (1899); 3 Wovaa'za, THE AmERicAN
LAw oF ADMxNiSTRATioN (3d ed. 1923) 1981.
'In re Resler, 95 Fed. 804 (D. Minn. 1899); In re Wooten, 118 Fed. 670
(D. N. C. 1902). The right to plead the Statute of Limitations is given to
objecting creditors by judicial decision. In re Lafferty, 122 Fed. 558 (D. Pa.
1903).
See Patte'rson v. Miller, 72 N. C. 516, 517 (1875).
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ceeding which is provided by statute.2 7 In either, the personal repre-
sentative and all creditors may be made parties.28 All claims are proved
in court, and any creditor may object to the claim of any other cred-
itor, 2 9 and may, as against him, invoke the defense of the Statute of
Limitations.3 0  This procedure may be resorted to even after a personal
representative has decided to admit a claim barred by the Statute of
Limitations but before there has been any distribution of the assets.3 1
It being settled that a personal representative may be justified in
paying a claim barred by the Statute of Limitations or in suffering a
judgment to be recovered against the estate for such a claim, the prob-
lem yet remains whether, without making any payment or suffering any
judgment to be recovered, he may acknowledge a claim with the effect
of reviving it if it is already barred, or of tolling the Statute of Limita-
tions if it has not yet fully run. Apparently a mere acknowledgment,
admission, or new promise by the personal representative with reference
to a claim already barred is not binding upon the estate.3 2  But if a
claim which has not been barred is filed with the personal representa-
tive and is admitted by him, a North Carolina statute provides that it
shall not be necessary for the claimant to bring an action against the
estate to prevent the bar of the Statute of Limitations.83 This admis-
sion need not be in writing,3 4 may be implied, 5 and will prevent a
successful plea of the Statute of Limitations by the heirs in a proceed-
ing to sell property to make assets in order to pay the claim,3 6 just as
a judgment of a barred claim not contested by the personal representa-
tive will bind the heirs.
MARGARET CLOYD JOHNSON.
IN. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §§110-136.
'See Patterson v. Miller, 72 N. C. 516, 517 (1875).
2Oates v. Lilly, 84 N. C. 643 (1881); Dunn v. Beaman, 126 N. C. 766,
36 S. E. 172 (1900); see Wordsworth v. Davis, 75 N. C. 159, 162 (1876).
31 See Wordsworth v. Davis, 75 N. C. 159, 162 (1876); Dunn v. Beaman,
126 N. C. 766, 769, 36 S. E. 172, 173 (1900).
'Oates v. Lilly, 84 N. C. 643 (1881).
Oates v. Lilly, 84 N. C. 643 (1881); Whitehurst v. Dey, 90 N. C. 542(1884); see Tucker v. Baker, 94 N. C. 162, 166 (1886); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRAcTs, N. C. AxNoT. (1934) §85, (1934) 13 N. C. L. REv. 56, 59. Contra:
Billews v. Bogan, 2 N. C. 13 (1792); see Flemming v. Flemming, 85 N. C.
127, 128 (1881).
N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §412.
See Hinton v. Pritchard, 126 N. C. 8, 10, 35 S. E. 127, 128 (1900) ; Justice
v. Gallert, 131 N. C. 393, 396, 42 S. E. 850, 851 (1902); RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRAcTs, N. C. ANNor. (1934) §85, (1934) 13 N. C. L. REv. 56, 60.
'See Woodlief v. Bragg, 108 N. C. 571, 573, 13 S. E. 211, 212 (1891);
Turner v. Shuffler, 108 N. C. 642, 647, 13 S. E. 243, 245 (1891) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONcRAcrs, N. C. ANNOT. (1934) §85, (1934) 13 N. C. L. REV. 56, 60.
"Woodlief v. Bragg, 108 N. C.- 571, 13 S. E. 211 (1891) ; Turner v. Shuffler,
108 N. C. 642, 13 S. E. 243 (1891) ; Hinton v. Pritchard, 126 N. C. 8, 35 S. E.
127 (1900).
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Labor Law-Collective Bargaining Under the
National Labor Relations Act.
In two recent cases1 the federal courts have been called upon to
consider the problem of collective bargaining under the Wagner Act.
This is a comparatively new problem which is becoming increasingly
important. The Wagner Act provides that employees shall have the
rights of self-organization and collective bargaining,2 and that it shall
be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with the exercise
of these rights,3 or to refuse to bargain collectively with representatives
of his employees properly selected by a majority of the employees 4
constituting a unit appropriate for collective bargaining.5 If the em-
ployer is reported by his employees to the National Labor Relations
Board for having committed an unfair labor practice and is found
guilty in a hearing before the Board, he may be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom; and if he refuses, the order of the Board may be
enforced in a federal circuit court of appeals by a restraining order and
contempt proceedings.8
In addition to this power to prevent unfair labor practices, the
Board may also determine the proper representative for bargaining
purposes in case of a controversy. 7 In making this determination, the
first problem which arises is: What constitutes an appropriate bargain-
ing unit? The Act indicates no standards for deciding this question,
but only provides that the Board shall do so in each case in a manner
which will effectuate the purposes of the Act.8 From a practical stand-
point, it is necessary that there be some degree of similarity of working
conditions in the group of employees on whose behalf the bargaining
is to be done, as the grievances of various types of employees in a
plant might be so different as to make it impossible for a single agency
to bargain effectively in behalf of all. The Board has used a number
of rather vague considerations, such as community of interest,9 func-
tional coherence,' 0 craft,"1 geographical differences,' 2 and whether em-
'National Labor Relations Board v. Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F. (2d)
18 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Hopwood Retinning
Co., 98 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
349 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §157 (Supp. 1938).
349 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §158(1) (Supp. 1938).
'49 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §158(5) (Supp. 1938).
149 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §159(a) (Supp. 1938).
149 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §160 (Supp. 1938).
749 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §159(c) (Supp. 1938).
849 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §159(b) (Supp. 1938).
'In re Chrysler Corp., 1 NLRB 164 (1936); In re Bell Oil and Gas Co., 1
NLRB 562 (1936).
I01n re U. S. Stamping Co., 1 NLRB 123 (1936); In re Atlantic Refining
Co., 1 NLRB 359 (1936).
htn re Ocean Steamship Co., 2 NLRB 588 (1937); it re P. Lorillard Co..
3 NLRB 529 (1937).
"In re Central Truck Lines, Inc., 3 NLRB 317 (1937): In re Bites Coleman
Lumber Co., 4 NLRB 679 (1937).
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ployees were on an hourly, tonnage, or piecework basis ;18 but as these
terms are applied to the diverse situations present in different industries,
it is impossible to draw any generalizations as to the make-up of an
appropriate unit. In most cases, the Board accepts the unit presented
without question unless this point is in controversy, in which case it
has tended to favor the craft rather than the plant unit.14
Within the unit, the representative agency is to be chosen by the
majority of the employees as the exclusive representative of all the em-
ployees in the unit.15 This agency is usually a union, which then se-
lects particular persons to do the actual negotiating with the employer,
so that, in effect, representatives chosen by the union to which the
majority of the employees belong are the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in the unit, whether union members or not. When a
substantial doubt exists as to the proper agency, the employer is under
no duty to bargain until the Board has made its certification, provided
he has made reasonable efforts to discover the proper representative."0
In many cases it is clear what organization represents the majority,
but in case of doubt, the controversy is usually submitted to the Board
at the instance of the unions or the employees, the employer having no
power to invoke the jurisdiction of the Board. The Board may then
hold a hearing to investigate the controversy. 17 Ordinarily, an election
is also held among the employees to determine what agency represents
the majority,' 8 but in some cases the Board makes its certification on
the basis of investigation alone.' 9 Although in many cases investiga-
tion would probably disclose which group has the better claim as the
proper agency, in cases of substantial doubt, determination on the basis
of investigation alone might prove inaccurate and would be very diffi-
cult without the aid of detailed information. Quite naturally, the pro-
cedure of the Wagner Act has occasioned sharp struggles for certifi-
"In re Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 2 NLRB 772 (1937); In re Sheba Ann
Frocks, Inc., 3 NLRB 97 (1937).
"In re Globe Machine and Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 294 (1937); It re City
Auto Stamping Co., 3 NLRB 306 (1937); In re Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
3 NLRB 622 (1937).
149 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §159(a) (Supp. 1938), National Labor
Relations Board v. Delaware-New Jersey Ferry Co., 90 F. (2d) 520 (C. C. A.
3d, 1937), cert..denied, 302 U. S. 731, 58 Sup. Ct. 141, 82 L. ed. 104 (1938).
"'National Labor Relations Board v. Remington Rand, 94 F. (2d) 862
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938); Black Diamond S. S. Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 98 F. (2d) 875 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
"49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §159(c) (Supp. 1938).
"It re Gate City Cotton Mills, 1 NLRB 57 (1935) ; In re International Nickel
Co., 1 NLRB 907 (1936). However, the Board must conduct the election in
fairness to all parties. Surpass Leather Co. v. Winters, 23 F. Supp. 776(W. D. N. Y. 1938).
"In re Cosmopolitan Shipping Co., 2 NLRB 759 (1937); In re Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 4 NLRB 193 (1938). Section 159(c) of the Act provides that
the Board may take a secret ballot or use any other suitable means to de-
termine the proper representative.
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cation as the representative agency between various labor unions when
more than one is strongly represented in a plant or factory, and has
served to create additional controversy in many cases between the
A. F. of L. and the C. I. 0. Following a policy of declining to inter-
fere with the internal affairs of labor unions, the Board with the ap-
proval of the courts has held that when rival unions, both affiliated
with the same national union, claim to be the proper representative of
a group of employees, the parent union must settle the dispute. 20 When
rival unions are affiliated with different parent unions, it is impossible
to side-step the issue. The tendency to favor craft rather than plant
units from which to select the bargaining agency has resulted in giving
the A. F. of L. unions the advantage in most cases, as these unions are
organized on a craft basis while those of the C. I. 0. are organized on
a plant basis without regard for the different trades represented
therein.2 ' In many instances, employers have attempted to protect
themselves from outside unions by forming company unions which will
almost inevitably represent the majority, as employees will usually be
afraid not to join the company union even though they have no desire
to do so. Because of this danger of coercion, the Board with the
approval of the courts has uniformly held that the organization of
company unions constitutes an unfair labor practice as interfering with
self-organization. 22
Once the proper agency for collective bargaining has been deter-
mined, the question arises as to when the employer has discharged the
duty placed on him by the Act. In general terms it has been stated
that there must be a bona fide attempt to reach an agreement even
though none is actually reached, 23 but it has proved difficult for em-
ployers to satisfy this requirement. Obviously, an absolute refusal
to negotiate with the union representing the majority does not consti-
tute collective bargaining.2 4 In cases where the employer refused to
'California State Brewer's Institute v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Stablemen, and Helpers of America, 19 F.' Supp. 824 (N. D.
Cal. 1937); In re Aluminum Co., 1 NLRB 530 (1936); In re Axton-Fisher To-
bacco Co., 1 NLRB 604 (1936). z' Note (1937) 47 Y;%ix L. J. 122.
'National Labor Relations Board v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303
U. S. 261, 58 Sup. Ct. 571, 82 L. ed. 524 (1938); National Labor Relations
Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937); National
Labor Relations Board v. J. Freezer & Son, 95 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938); In re Alaska Juneau Mining Co., 2 NLRB 125 (1936); In re Metro-
politan Engineering Co., 4 NLRB 542 (1937).
'See Jeffrey-De Witt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 91
F. (2d) 134, 139 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 731, 58 Sup. Ct.
55; 82 L. ed. 34 (1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co.,
96 F. (2d) 721, 725 (C. C. A. 6th, 1938); National Labor Relations Board v.
Biles Coleman Lumber Co., 98 F. (2d) 18, 22 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938); I re
Atlas Mills, 3 NLRB 10, 15 (1937).
" 1n re Black Diamond S. S. Corp., 3 NLRB 84 (1937); In re Suburban
Lumber Co., 3 NLRB 194 (1937); In re Cating Rope Works, 4 NLRR 1100(1938).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
meet with the union, but was willing to bargain with the employees
individually 25 or with a committee selected on the basis of proportional
representation,26 such action has been held to constitute a refusal to
bargain collectively. It is suggested that the latter method, by which
each union and also non-union employees would be represented on the
bargaining committee in the ratio in which each group stood to the
total number of employees in the plant, would be more equitable than
that employed under the Wagner Act, as it would give the minority
groups representation, which they do not have as the Act now stands.
Merely meeting with the union without evidence of a real intent to
enter an agreement does not satisfy the requirement that there must
have been a bona fide attempt to reach an agreement. 27 In only one
case before the Board has this requirement been considered satisfied,
in which case the employer entered an actual agreement favorable to
the union.28 Where the employer has made counter-proposals unac-
ceptable to the union, such proposals have been held not to have been
made in good faith ;29 and, in most cases where some of the requests of
the union have been granted, a distinction has been drawn between
acceding to particular demands and collective bargaining, with the re-
sult that the employer was still held guilty of refusing to bargain col-
lectively. 0 This attitude of the Board has been judicially disapproved
on the ground that it is manifestly unfair to deprive the employer of
freedom of contract by virtually binding him to enter an agreement,
although the employees are left free to refuse to agree indefinitely.3 '
This argument seems well founded, as it is almost impossible for the
employer to escape the charge of unfair labor practices without acced-
ing almost wholly to union demands, especially in view of the holding
that reaching an impasse in the negotiations will not discharge him
from his duty to bargain.3 2 It seems that, in view of the burden in
this respect placed on the employer, some degree of reasonableness in
the negotiations should be required of the union also. This might be
accomplished by discharging the employer from the duty of bargaining
'In re Atlantic Refining Co., 1 NLRB 359 (1936) ; In re Millffay Mfg. Co.,
2 NLRB 919 (1937).
'4 In re Alaska Juneau Mining Co., 2 NLRB 125 (1936); In re Boss Mfg.
Co., 3 NLRB 400 (1938).
2In re Canton Enameling and Stamping Co., 1 NLRB 402 (1936); In re
Shell Oil Co. of Cal., 2 NLRB 835 (1937); In re Scandore Paper Box Co.,
4 NLRB 910 (1938).
=In re Trenton Garment Co., 4 NLRB 1186 (1938).
2In re Atlas Mills, Inc., 3 NLRB 10 (1937).
l°in re Bendix Products Corp., 1 NLRB 173 (1936); In re Timken Silent
Automatic Co., 1 NLRB 335 (1936); In re St. Joseph's Stockyards Co., 2 NLRB
39 (1936).
" See Bendix Products Corp. v. Beman, 14 F. Supp. 58, 69 (N. D. Ill. 1936).
' Jeffrey-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 91 F. (2d)
134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 731, 58 Sup. Ct. 55, 82 L. ed.
34 (1938).
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further if the employees do not manifest the same bona fide intent to
bargain which is required of him, and by giving him recourse to the
Board if they continue to be unreasonable. The employer's duty is
not excused by a strike, as the Act provides that the right to strike
is not to be impaired by any provisions of the Act.33 On the other hand,
the employer is excused from further negotiation if the employees
break a prior collective agreement, 34 or if they absolutely refuse to
negotiate.3 5  However, the employer has no means to compel the em-
ployees to negotiate and cannot seek redress from the Board, as can the
employees .
3
Questions as to the appropriate unit and agency and as to whether
there has been a refusal to bargain collectively are questions of fact
for the Board, whose findings thereon are binding upon the courts if
supported by substantial evidence, the test of substantiality being the
same as that presented in contesting a motion for a directed verdict
in an action at law.37
Since the bargaining agency, when properly chosen, becomes the
exclusive representative of all the employees in the unit,38 it has been
held that the employer is under no duty to bargain with the minority ;39
and, as a corollary to his duty to bargain with representatives of the
majority, the courts have arrived at the conclusion that he has a corres-
ponding right to do so, which may be protected by an injunction against
a striking minority seeking to interfere therewith, provided the ma-
jority has been certified by the Board.40 In granting injunctions in
such situations, the courts are confronted with the Norris-LaGuardia
Act, restricting issuance of injunctions in labor disputes.41 But the
149 STAT. 457 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §163 (Supp. 1938), National Labor
Relations Board v. Carlisle Lumber Co., 94 F. (2d) 138 (C. C. A. 9th, 1938),
It re Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 NLRB 837 (1936).
'National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 96 F. (2d) 721
(C. C. A. 6th, 1938) (Although no direct means for enforcement of collective
contracts is provided in the act, this may be an indirect means.)
*ln re Seas Shipping Co., 4 NLRB 757 (1938).
149 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §160 (Supp. 1938) ; Sharpe & Dohme,
Inc., v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union, 24 F. Supp. 701 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
'Appalachian Electric Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 93 F.(2d) 985 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); National Labor Relations Board v. Wallace
Mfg. Co., 95 F. (2d) 818 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938); National Labor Relations
Board v. Bell Oil and Gas Co., 98 F. (2d) 870 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) (in which
it was also held that while the Board may hear incompetent evidence, it may
not make an order based solely upon such evidence).
n49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §159(a) (Supp. 1938).
'Mooresville Cotton Mills v. National Labor Relations Board, 94 F. (2d)
61 (C. C. A. 4th, 1938).40Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp. 20
(E. D. Mo. 1937); Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food Clerks and
Managers Union, 98 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938); note (1938) 36 Micr.
L. REv. 844.
147 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §101 (Supp. 1938), provides that the
courts may not issue injunctions in labor disputes except in conformity with
the provisions of the Act. 47 STAT. 73 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. §113(c) (Supp.
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Wagner Act makes the Norris-LaGuardia Act inapplicable to injunc-
tions issued to enforce orders of the Board.42 Therefore, when the
Board has taken action certifying the majority and ordering the em-
ployer to bargain with it, the Norris-LaGuardia Act is inapplicable to
an injunction against the minority issued to enforce the Board's
order.43 However, when no action has been taken by the Board the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is applicable and its provisions must be satis-
fied,44 the Wagner Act being inapplicable as the courts under the latter
Act cannot protect collective proceedings between employer and em-
ployee unless they have been sanctioned by the Board.45 The difficulty
in this situation is that, as the employer cannot invoke the jurisdiction
of the Board, he is powerless to protect himself if his employees strike
in the course of a dispute as to which is the proper bargaining agency
and refuse to submit the question to the Board.46 .This illustrates one
of the principal defects in the Act-lack of protection to the employer
in the face of unreasonableness on the part of the employees. The non-
union minority is not much better off, for while it may still present
grievances to the employer, 47 there is little chance that these demands
will be met, especially if they conflict with those of the majority, with
whom the employer is under a duty to bargain. Since the minority rmiay
be enjoined from striking when he Board has certified the majority,
the right to strike is no longer available to the minority in such a
situation. Obviously, this view is essential to the smooth working of
the Act, but much of the difficulty might be avoided by giving the mi-
nority representation in the bargain.ag negotiations, perhaps on the
basis of proportional representation.
ELIZABETH SHEWMAKE.
1938), defines a labor dispute as a controversy concerning conditions of em-
ployment or representation in negotiations, regardless of whether the disputants
stand in the relation of employer and employee.
149 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §160(h) (Supp. 1938).
'Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers of America, 21 F. Supp. 20
(E. D. Mo. 1937); Union Premier Food Stores v. Retail Food Clerks and
Managers Union, 98 F. (2d) 821 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938); see Sharpe & Dohme,
Inc., v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union, 24 F. Supp. 701, 702 (E. D. Pa.
1938).
Grace Co. v. Williams, 20 F. Supp. 263 (W. D. Mo. 1937), aff'd, 96 F. (2d)
478 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Cupples Co. v. American Federation of Labor, 20 F.
Supp. 894 (E. D. Mo. 1937); Donnelly Garment Co. v. International Ladies
Garment Workers Union, 23 F. Supp. 998 (W. D. Mo. 1938); Sharpe & Dohme,
Inc., v. Storage Warehouse Employees Union, 24 F. Supp. 701 (E. D. Pa.
1938). Nor can the majority union obtain an injunction unless the Board has
passed on the controversy. Joel v. Rosseter, 15 F. Supp. 914 CN. D. Cal. 1936);
Blankenship v. Kurfman, 96 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
, Lund v. Woodenware Workers Union, 19 F. Supp. 607 (D. Minn. 1938).
Sharpe & Dohme, Inc., v. Storage Warehouse Workers Union, 24 F. Supp.
701 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
"49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. §159(a) (Supp. 1938).
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Mortgages-Statutes Modifying Deficiency Judgments-
Availability to Sureties.
A North Carolina statute provides, in substance, that when a sale
of real estate is made by "... a mortgagee, trustee, or other person
authorized to make the same . . ." when such person or the holder of
the obligation secured becomes the purchaser, in an action for a de-
ficiency judgment ". . . against the mortgagor,. trustor or other maker
of any such obligation . . ." the defendant shall be allowed to show
by way of defense or offset the true value of the property.1 A recent
North Carolina case raised, but apparently did not find it necessary
to decide finally, the interesting question whether this provision is
available as a defense to a guarantor of a note secured by a mortgage.2
It is manifest that a solution does not lie in an interpretation of the'
language of the provision.
Statutory provisions similar to this one are not unusual,3 the pro-
visions having been enacted during the period when moratorium legis-
lation was being considered in the several states. The policy of the
statutes is, obviously, to protect distressed debtors from the rigors of
a deflated real estate market. The question whether such statutes are
available as a defense to sureties,4 apparently, has arisen only in New
York,5 where express language would seem to apply for their benefit,0
1N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) §2593(d).
'Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N. C. 196, 198 S. E. 645 (1938).
'The constitutionality of these statutes is not within the scope of this note.
See note (1937) 15 N. C. L. Rav. 273. The statutes are of three types: (1)
those which, like the N. C. statute, allow the fair market value to be shown
as a defense or offset, ALA. CoDE ANN. (Michie, 2d 1936 Supp.) §9028(3);
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. (Cahill, Supp. 1936) §1083-a; S. C. Acts 1933, no. 264; S. D.
Laws 1937, c. 208; (2) those which abolish deficiency judgments, Idaho Laws
1937, c. 31, §1; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, Supp. 1938) §5021.6; Mont. Laws
1937, c. 73, §9; NEB. ComP. STAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1937) §20-2141; N. D. Laws
1937, c. 159, §1; (3) those which provide a means for arriving at a fair fore-
closure sale price, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Compact ed. 1936) tit. 21, §§809 et
seq.; WASH. REv. STAT. AN. (Remington, Supp. 1938) §1118; Wis. STAT.(Brossard, 1937) §281.206. North Carolina likewise has provisions of this latter
type. N. C. CoDE AiNN. (Michie, 1935) §2593(b). For a thorough discussion
see Poteat, State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage Debtor During the De-
pression (1938) 5 LAW & CONTEaP. PROB. 517.
'"Sureties" is used 'here and throughout the note to include technical sureties,
guarantors, and indorsers. It is not believed that the legal distinctions between
these types of third party obligors are relative to the problems under consid-
eration.
A surety is within the terms of the statute. Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y.
144, 190 N. E. 324 (1934); Farmers' and Mechanics' Say. Bank of Lockport
v. Eagle Bldg. Co., 153 Misc. 554, 276 N. Y. Supp, 246 (Sup. Ct. 1934);
Gaimari v. Horch, 249 App. Div. 537, 293 N. Y. Supp. 479 (1st Dep't 1937).
'Compare N. Y. Civ. PRAC. (Cahill, Supp. 1936) .§1083-b, "In any action
commenced ... against any person or corporation directly or indirectly(italics ours) or contingently liable . . . " with N. C. CODE ANw. (Michie,
1935) §2593(d), ". . shall sue for and undertake to recover i. deficiency judg-
ment against the mortgagor, trustor or other maker of any such obligation
whose property [italics ours] has -been so purchased. .... "
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as would the language of statutes of some other states.7 On the other
hand, a rather unusual provision in the North Dakota statute seems to
preclude the use of the defense by sureties&8
Sureties, as well as their principals, in cases involving transactions
prohibited by law are generally allowed to plead as a defense to their
obligations the illegality of the transactions.8 Thus under a statute pro-
hibiting the execution of certain notes by a banking association, the
surety on these notes was allowed the defense of the statute.10 And
in an action against the surety on a depository bond, the surety was
allowed to plead by way of defense a federal statute which temporarily
suspended payments on deposits.:" In North Carolina it has been held
that a surety on a bond given to support a "trade expansion" plan, in
fact a lottery, could plead by way of defense the illegality of the trans-
action.' 2 This defense was also allowed a surety on a bond to secure
the payment of rent where the use of the premises was for an illegal
purpose.' 3 But these types of cases are to be distinguished from cases
involving so-called "personal defenses", those available to the principal
only. As to the latter, courts quite generally treat the principal's de-
fenses of infancy, coverture, insanity, iltra vires, and discharge in
bankruptcy as defenses available only to the principal; however, the
cases are in conflict as to whether the principal's defenses of usury,
fraud, duress, and the Statute of Limitations are available to the surety
also.
1 4
By reason of conflict in the cases and failure of courts to explain
the reason for the results reached, it is difficult to state any principle,
consistent with the cases, for determining what defenses of the princi-
pal are available to the surety. But it is submitted that the ultimate
measure of the surety's liability should be the extent of his bargain.
Any defense which may reasonably be said to be one the surety bar-
'See note 3, supra, group (2) and PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Compact ed.
1936) tit. 21 §§806 807 (plaintiff shall petition court to fix fair value). See also
CAL. GEN. LAws ?Deering, 1937) Act 5101, §18.
8
"Nothing herein contained shall be construed to postpone or affect any rem-
edies the creditor may have against any party personally liable for the debt
other than the contractor or purchaser and their successors in interest." N. D.
Laws 1937, c.159, §I.
IFEINSINGER, ST§A11 Es' LAW OF SuRETYsHnP (4th ed. 1934) §103.
"Swift v. Beers, 3 Denio 70 (N. Y. 1846).
'East Cleveland v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., 5 F. Supp. 212 (N. D.
Ohio 1933). Contra: Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 314 Pa. 140, 170 AtI. 686 (1934), (1934) 32 U. of PA. L. REv.
659. The latter case reached its result on the theory that the agreement was
one of indemnity.
" Basnight v. American Mfg. Co., 174 N. C. 206, 93 S. E. 734 (1917). But
cf. Poindexter v. Davis, 67 N. C. 112 (1872) (surety on bond execute4 to raise
money to pay off a debt contracted to equip a Confederate company is liable
since illegality is "too remote").
" Mound v. Barker, 71 Vt. 253, 44 At. 346 (1899).
"Note (1937) 46 YALE L. J. 833, 835.
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gains to protect the creditor against should not be available to the
surety.' 5 Thus, it is properly held that lack of capacity in the debtor
is no defense to the surety, for it is reasonable to suppose a surety
contemplated protection of the creditor from non-payment arising
from such-a cause. For example, a surety is commonly procured on
an infant's obligation for the very purpose of protecting the creditor
should the debtor assert infancy as a defense.' 6 Admittedly the prin-
ciple above advanced is not consistent with cases which have held that
the debtor's defenses of fraud, duress, usury, and the Statute of Limita-
tions are not available to the surety. Obviously it cannot be said that
the surety's bargain contemplated protection of the creditor against
such defenses, for they are the result of the creditor's own acts. But
it is submitted that these decisions are scarcely to be reconciled with
any reasonable principle for determining when a defense of the debtor
should be available to the surety.' 7
Can it be said that the surety's bargain reasonably contemplates
protection of the creditor from defenses such as that raised by the
statute involved in the instant case? The surety's bargain was to make
the creditor whole, and since the theory of the statute is that the cred-
itor should be charged with the value of the land which he obtains,
why should the creditor be allowed a profit from the surety ?18 Fur-
ther, if the policy of the statute be to relieve oppressed debtors where
the debt has been reasonably satisfied, the surety is certainly within
the class of the oppressed, especially where he is an accommodation
But see id. at 836.
President and Fellows of Harvard College v. Kempner, 131 App. Div. 848,
116 N. Y. Supp. 437 (2d Dep't 1909); Industrial Text-Book Co. v. Mabbot,
159 Wis. 423, 150 N. W. 429 (1915).
"T Statute of Limitations cases present a situation analogous to that in the
instant case. On authority of Knox County v. Blake, 2 Ohio St. 147 (1853),
sureties on bonds of public officers are allowed, uniformly, their principal's
defense, since such is necessary, because of the reimbursement problem, to carry
out the policy of these special limitations. Sonoma County v. Hall, 129 Cal.
659, 62 Pac. 257 (1900). But where the creditor fails to file a claim against
a bankrupt or decedent's estate, there is an almost equal uniformity of refusal
to allow the principal's defense to the surety. Duerr v. Sloan, 50 Cal. App. 512,
195 Pac. 475 (1920) ; Armstrong v. Citizens' and Southern Bank, 145 Ga. 861,
90 S. E. 44 (1916). And such is true generally in the case of an ordinary
suretyship on a claim against a living and solvent principal. United States v.
Mercantile Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 213 Pa. 411, 62 Atl. 1062 (1906). Contra:
Auchampaugh v. Schmidt, 70 Iowa 642, 27 N. W. 805 (1886). But is not the
policy of all types of limitation the same so far as any matter affecting the
liability of the surety is concerned?
29 Cf. Better Plan Building & Loan Ass'n v. Holden, 114 N. J. Eq. 537, 169
Atl. 289 (Ch. 1933). "The surety has just as much of an equitable right as
the primary debtor to have the fair and equitable value of the premises which
the mortgagee has acquired credited upon the mortgage debt." Id. at 541, 169
Atl. at 291. Of course, it may be argued in answer that the surety should pay
and himself be subrogated to the right to obtain the land at its reasonable value.
But in a mortgage transaction do not the parties contemplate that where there
has been a foreclosure the surety's contract exists as a protection against a de-
ficiency?
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party, for there he has. suffered all of the bitter without any of the
sweet. His distress is expressly recognized in California where, by
statute, the bringing of an action against a guarantor on a note secured
by a mortgage or deed of trust is prohibited during the period of the
emergency.' 9 A New York provision went even further by absolutely
prohibiting the mortgage guaranty business because of the tremendous
losses suffered by these businesses, and the impossibility of determining
feasible rates.2
0
It is obvious that one of two results will obtain if the surety cannot
plead the statute involved in the principal case. Either he can or
cannot seek reimbursement from the principal for the full amount
paid the creditor. In either case the result is unsound. If the surety
be held liable under the North Carolina statute for the full deficiency,
and then is limited in his claim for reimbursement from the debtor to
the deficiency above the fair value of the land, it is plain that the
debtor's protection under the statute is at the expense of the surety,
not the creditor.21 Certainly the policy of the statute contemplates no
such result. Further, the surety has been deprived of his contemplated
reimbursement against the debtor. If, on the other hand, the surety
is held liable and allowed full reimbursement, an equally undesirable
result is obtained, for then the creditor is allowed to do indirectly that
which he is prohibited from doing directly, and the principal is de-
prived of the benefit of the statute.22
It might be further argued that the effect of the statute is the same
as payment which could be pleaded as a defense by the surety. The
reasoning of such an argument is not believed to be sound since pay-
ment would seem to imply something more than the extinguishment of
the debt,23 especially where extinguishment results, not from an act
of the parties, but by operation of law; however, in an interesting case
in equity in New Jersey, without the benefit of a statute of this nature,
the fair market value of the land foreclosed was credited to the debt
where the mortgagee bought at a grossly inadequate price, and the
surety was allowed to plead this defense as payment.
24
OscAR LEAK TYREE.
"CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 5101, §18.
CON-SOLIDATED LAWS oF N. Y. (Cahill, 1931-35 Supp.) 798.
See Klinke v. Samuels, 264 N. Y. 144, 147, 190 N. E. 324, 326 (1934).
'See Knox County v. Blake, 2 Ohio St. 147, 151 (1853).
m "It follows, therefore, that every act which, while it extinguishes the obli-
gation, has also for its object the release of the debtor and his exemption from
liability, is not payment. Payment is doing precisely what the payer has agreed
to do." BOUVIER, LAW DiCrioNARY (Rawles' Rev. 1914) 2540.
'
1Better Plan Building & Loan Ass'n v. Holden, 114 N. J. Eq. 537, 169 At.
289 (Ch. 1933) ; see Virginia Trust Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N. C. 196, 198, 198 S. E
645, 646 (1938). Accord: Rohrer v. Strickland, 116 Va. 755, 82 S. E. 711 (1914),
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Physicians and Surgeons-Cobperatives-Corporations
Practicing Medicine-Insurance.
There has been much apparently justifiable criticism of the Ameri-
can medical system-criticism founded upon its failure to meet the
needs for medical service, particularly among the low income classes.'
With the idea of providing necessary medical attention for a fixed, pre-
determined rate payable at specified times, various remedial plans have
been proposed and attempted with varying success2 . Analysis of two
such plans recently under judicial scrutiny serves as a fairly accurate
indication of the attendant legal difficulties.
A California corporation for a specified premium contracted to pay
under certain conditions for services rendered by physicians, hospitals,
and medical laboratories. When a contractee needed the specified serv-
ices he was treated by a physician selected from the corporation's ap-
proved list. The corporation was a stock company operated for profit,
which solicited the purchase of its contracts by the general public, and
paid commissions to its solicitors. In a quo warranto proceeding, held,
the corporation was illegally practicing medicine.3
The other case involved a co6perative corporation known as the
Group Health Association, Inc. Organized for civilian government
employees (primarily HOLC workers, 65% of whom joined), it fur-
nished almost complete medical service to its members and their fam-
ilies for a specified fee per month. The Association was a non-profit
organization, which maintained a clinic with a staff of six doctors who
were paid on a salary rather than a fee basis. Held, the corporation
was not illegally practicing medicine, nor did it come within the scope
of regulatory insurance laws. 4
Whether by express enactment or by reason of judicial interpreta-
tions of statutes requiring a medical education, certificate of character,
and a licensing examination, the well-settled rule is that a corporation
cannot engage in the practice of dentistry or medicine, 5 though there
' COMMITTEE ON COSTS OF MEDICALr CARE, MEDICAL CARE FOR THE AMERIcAN
PEOPLE (1932) 1-35.
2 CoMmrrrE ON CosTs OF MEDICAL CARE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 73-101.
'People ex rel. State Board of Medical Examiners v. Pacific Health Cor-
poration, Inc., 82 P. (2d) 429 (Cal. 1938).
' Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D. D. C. 1938) ; 83 CONO.
REc. 3620 (1938) (contains facts as to 6rganization not found in the case state-
ment).
6 Messner v. Board of Dental Examiners of Cal., 87 Cal. App. 199, 262 Pac.
58 (1927); Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners of Cal., 216 Cal.
285, 14 P. (2d) 67 (1932); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10 Cal.
App. (2d) 592, 52 P. (2d) 992 (1935); Benjamin Franklin Life Assur. Co. v.
Mitchell, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 654, 58 P. (2d) 984 (1936); Masters v. Board of
Dental Examiners of Cal., 15 Cal. App. (2d) 506, 59 P. (2d) 827 (1936);
People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Col. 304, 275 Pac. 928 (1929), cert. denied,
280 U. S. 566, 50 Sup. Ct 25, 76 L. ed. 620 (1929); People v. United Medical
Service, "Inc., 362 Ill. 442, 200 N. E. 157 (1936); State v. Bailey Dental Co.,
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is some lack of uniformity in the application of the rule.6 The usual
objections to the corporate practice of medicine are that: (1) a corpora-
tion under the control of profit-seeking laymen is not so easily amenable
to the ethical standards of the profession; (2) the confidential relation
between the doctor and the patient is destroyed; and (3) the doctor's
responsibility, which should be entirely with the patient, is divided
between the patient and the employer corporation.7 Any lay controlled
corporation organized for profit, including the defendant in the prin-
cipal case from California, would seem to be objectionable on these
same grounds, regardless of the particular scheme involved.8 Con-
211 Iowa 781, 234 N. W. 260 (1931); People v. John H. Woodbury Derma-
tological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E. 697 (1908).
'In State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N. W. 1078
(1905), the court held that a corporation, the stockholders of which were all
doctors, could contract for the services of its members and other licensed physi-
cians. The ruling was followed in State Electro-Medical Institute v. Platner,
74 Neb. 23, 103 N. W. 1079 (1905). In State v. Lewin, 128 Mo. App. 149, 106
S. W. 581 (1907), this same result was reached concerning a corporation in
which the doctor who managed the organization and treated the patients owned
98% of the stock. Although in none of these cases did the court expressly rely
on this ground, it should be noted that as the corporations were entirely, or
almost entirely, owned and controlled by physicians, many of the objections to
corporate practice of medicine by lay-controlled corporations did not exist. The
reasoning relied on by the courts in these decisions was that the corporation it-
self did not render the services-it merely contracted with the doctor to have
the services rendered. In the Nebraska case the court felt that statutory re-
quirements for the practice of medicine were personal to the practitioner, and
were passed to protect the public against incompetent practitioners. If corporate
employees had their licenses this purpose would be served.
In holding unconstitutional a statute requiring one to submit to an exami-
nation and secure a license from the state board in order to run, own, or man-
age a dental office, the Washington court felt that society was sufficiently pro-
tected even though ownership and management were in unlicensed hands, if the
actual dentistry was done by licensed men. State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79
Pac. 635 (1905). This view was substantially followed in Messner v. Board
of Dental Examiners of Cal., 87 Cal. App. 199, 262 Pac. 58 (1927) in which
it was held that as long as the professional aspects of the office were under pro-
fessional control, the business aspects could be under lay control. In a later
California case this position was taken by the dissent, but the majority refused
to follow it. The decision indicates, though, that the majority felt that there
was really no control of the professional aspects of the offices by professional
men. Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners of Cal., 216 Cal. 285,
14 P. (2d) 67 (1932).
As to the practice of optometry by a corporation hiring licensed optome-
trists to work for it there is a definite split of authority. Cases allowing it
are: State ex tel. Att'y Gen. v. Gus Blass Co., 193 Ark. 1159, 105 S. W. (2d)
853 (1935) ; Georgia State Board of Exam'rs in Optometry v. Friedman's Jew-
elers, Inc., 183 Ga. 669, 189 S. E. 238 (1936) ; Jaekle v. L. Bamburger & Co.,
119 N. J. Eq. 126, 181 Atl. 181 (Ch. 1935), aff'd, 120 N. J. Eq. 201, 184 Atl.
520 (1936). Contra: State v. Kindly Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N. W.
332 (1933) ; State ex rel. Bricker v. Buhl Optical Co., 131 Ohio St. 217, 2 N. E.
(2d) 601 (1936) ; Neill v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 330 Pa. 213, 199 Atl. 178 (1938).
For a good discussion of this problem see note (1937) 11 TEmX. L. Q. 232.
"See note 5, supra. These objections are referred to in whole or in part in
practically all of the cases forbidding corporate medical practice.8 COMMrrTEE ON CosTs OF MEDICAL CARE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 96. In at
least two cases involving substantially the same facts as the instant California
case the doctrine has been applied: Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 10
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ceding that in the face of modern acquisitiveness the maintenance of
professional standards is desirable, commendable indeed is the general
tendency of the judiciary to include all these types of schemes within
a broad prohibition against corporate professional practice.
However, fundamentally different from the lay controlled, profit
seeking corporation is the plan exemplified by the Group Health Asso-
ciation, Inc. In an article on "Cooperative Medicine and the Law"9
it is pointed out that organizations of this sort, being non-profit, suffer
little danger of any commercialism entailing a lowering of professional
ethics. As the patients are the officers and stockholders, there is no
risk of an undesirable division of the physician's responsibility and
loyalty between his patients and his employers. Although a device of
this sort to some degree eliminates the patient's free choice of a phy-
sician, the authors suggest that by voluntarily joining the organization
the patient in effect chooses the doctors connected with it. He also
has some voice in the selection of doctors because affiliated doctors are
selected by trustees elected by the patient-stockholders. Moreover, as
indicated, it is questionable whether actually the desirability of free
choice of a doctor by the average person, who knows nothing about
medicine, balances the advantages of having a committee select physi-
cians after investigation and group inquiry as to their competence and
desirability.
In the Group Health Association case the fact was not discussed
that the organization of a non-profit co6perative is such as to remove
the usual objections to corporate invasion of the professional realm,
but it seems to have been recognized by the court.'0 The court in the
principal California case recognized a fundamental difference between-a
non-profit, limited membership, incorporated coperative association,
and a lay controlled corporation catering to the general public with
the profit motive." There is, then, justification for the decision that
the coiperative was not illegally practicing medicine.
The objection still must be met that insurance laws are being vi-
olated. Just what constitutes being in the insurance business is a
matter concerning which there are widely varying interpretations.'
2
Cal. App. (2d) 592, 52 P. (2d) 992 (1935); Benjamin Franklin Life Assur.
Co. v. Mitchell, 14 Cal. App. (2d) 654, 58 P. (2d) 984 (1936).
'Levy and Mermin, Cooperative Medicine and the Law (1938) 1 LAWY.
GuiLD Q. 194.
10Group Health Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445, 446 (D. D. C. 1938)
("Such a corporation, not for profit but for the mutual benefit of its members,
[italics added] is ...not engaged in the practice of medicine.")
t' People ex rel. State Board of Medical Exam'rs v. Pacific Health Corp.,
Inc., 82 P. (2d) 429, 431 (Cal. 1938).
"Illustrative of varying interpretations by different courts are the cases in-
volving the Physicians' Defense Co. The same contract, whereby for certain
premiums the corporation agreed to defend physicians in civil malpractice suits,
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A recent note in this Law Review13 points out that although the
technical elements of insurance 14 are present, in determining if insur-
ance laws apply courts often ask: (1) is there control in the contractor
over the contingency involved-if so there is no insurance, (2) is the
purpose of the contract primarily insurance-or does it only inciden-
tally result in benefits technically similar to insurance, or (3) is the
company of such a type that it should be subjected to insurance regu-
lation, in other words, is there necessity for regulation?
In applying these tests to the devices exemplified in the principal
cases, the tests of control and purpose of the contract stamp both or-
g.anizations as engaged in the insurance business. However, considera-
tion of the necessity of subjecting these devices to general insurance
regulation suggests that although general insurance laws should be
invoked against the California type of corporation' 5 -assuming it over-
comes the objection of illegal medical practice-the Group Health type
of set-up should not be subject to these laws. Stringent statutory regu-
lation of insurance has resulted from the rapid growth and widespread
business of insurance organizations."6 Its purpose has been to "protect
policyholders against fraud, imposition, insolvency, and misappropria-
tion of funds"'1 by insurance companies and their agents. Because of
but not to assume liability for any judgments rendered, was passed on by courts
of four jurisdictions. Saying that the element of indemnity was not present
because the corporation assumed no liability for judgments rendered, two courts
held the contract not to involve insurance. Vredenburgh v. Physicians' De-
fense Co., 126 Ill. App. 509 (1906); State ex rel. Physicians' Defense Co. v.
Laylin, 73 Ohio St. 90, 76 N. E. 567 (1905). Holding that the contingency of
paying attorneys' fees and costs of defense was the risk or peril assumed by the
corporation, two other courts held the contracts to be insurance agreements.
Physicians' Defense Co. v. Cooper, 199 Fed. 576 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912) ; Physi-
cians' Defense Co. v. O'Brien, 100 Minn. 490, 111 N. W. 396 (1907). The
court in the Ohio case held that although the corporation was not engaged in
insurance, a certificate authorizing it to practice in that state should be refused
because it would constitute the illegal practice of law by a corporation. In the
Minnesota case the dissent argued that neither transaction of insurance nor il-
legal corporate practice of law were involved in the contract. On the latter
point neither the majority in the Minnesota case nor in the other cases, except
the Ohio case, had anything to say. " Note (1937) 15 N. C. L. Rnv. 417.
"'VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 2 reads: "The contract of insurance,
made between parties called the insured and the 'insurer, is distinguished by the
presence of five elements:(a) The insured possesses an interest of some kind susceptible of pecuniary
estimation, known as an insurable interest.(b) The insured is subject to a risk, of loss through the destruction or im-
pairment of that interest by the happening of designated perils.(c) The insurer assumes that risk of loss.(d) Such assumption is part of a general scheme to distribute actual losses
among a large group of persons bearing similar risks.
(e) As consideration for the insurer's promise, the insured makes a ratable
contribution to a general insurance fund, called a premium,"
"CoMMITTEE ON COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 96.
" MowBRAy, Insurance in 8 ENCYc. OF SocrAL ScINcEs (1932) 99.
' State ex rel. Dist. Att'y Gen. v. Mutual Mortuary Ass'n, Inc., 166 Tenn.
260, 264, 61 S. W. (2d) 664, 665 (1933).
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the absence of the profit motive and high-pressure commission agents,
and because of its small, limited membership, the Group Health type of
organization seems substantially to lessen the probabilities of fraud,
imposition, insolvency, and misappropriation of funds. The purpose
of regulatory insurance laws is not to protect stockholders of small
corporations from themselves, yet this would be the effect of applying
general insurance laws to this co6perative. Also, to place this non-
profit coperative on the same plane with ordinary insurance com-
panies, and to require large reserves, frequent reports, etc., would
probably so increase the co5perative's expenses as to prevent it from
providing low cost medical attention to low income groups 8-- an ad-
mittedly desirable aim. Should it be felt that the possibilities of fraud,
etc. are not sufficiently removed it has been suggested that protection
might be best achieved not by subjecting the organization to the general
insurance laws-which might destroy the device-but by special legis-
lation to assure that: "(a) the facilities of the association, both physical
and personnel, would be adequate to provide proper care for the mem-
bership; (b) the membership fee would be large enough to give a
reasonable assurance of the solvency of the association; (c) no one
would be deceived as to what benefits accrue to membership, and the
limits of the services provided."' 9
In urging that the co~perative plan not be denominated an insur-
ance company, or a corporation illegally practicing medicine, it has been
assumed that the device is a socially desirable one. If the plan can in
some measure meet the great need for more widespread medical care,
it can hardly be said to be other than socially desirable. After five
years of intensive research, the Committee on Costs of Medical Care
concluded: "No one fact is more clearly demonstrated . . . than this
one: that the costs of medical care in any one year now fall very un-
evenly upon different families in the same income and population
groups. The heart of the problem, therefore, is the equalizing of the
financial impact of sickness. ' '20 According to the committee, for a
small fee from each member per month, the cost of illness may be
spread over a large group so as to make a great increase of medical
care available to low income groups who heretofore could not bear the
heavy cost burden of serious illness.21 Too, it is obvious that group
health service would present an excellent opportunity and incentive for
increased application of preventive medicine.2 2 Though it is not con-
S Levy and Mermin, supra note 9, at 206.
"Id. at 212.
'COMMITrEE ON COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 18.
MId. at 133.
1Id. at 12. The reasons for insufficient use of preventive medicine are given
as: (a) natural hesitation to seek medical aid unless driven to do so by dis-
comfort or pain, (b) economic factors such as necessity to pay on a fee-for-
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tended that this co~perative scheme will be a "cure all", it seems to
have sufficient merit to warrant resolving in its favor doubts as to
whether it constitutes illegal practice of medicine, or as to its character
as insurance within the scope of general regulatory statutes.
JosEPH M. I(TTNER.
Res Judicata-Persons Concluded-Representative Parties.
P brought an action to recover for loss of services and expenses
incurred as a result of D's allegedly negligent operation of an automo-
bile which injured P's minor daughter. The trial judge dismissed the
action on the ground that, in a previous action brought by P as next
friend of his minor daughter to recover damages for her personal in-
juries, it had been determined that D was not negligent. The North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that P was
not such a party to the former action as to be concluded by the findings
therein. Three justices dissented on the ground that P's participation
in, and control over, the prior action made him a party for purposes
of res judicata.1
Res judicata is the doctrine by which a final judgment rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction precludes the parties to the suit and
their privies from "relitigating" (1) the same cause of action,2 and
(2) those matters which were actually in issue and determined. In
the first-mentioned application of the doctrine, where a second action
is brought on the same cause of action, the judgment in the first action
is conclusive of every matter which was, or might have been, asserted
in support of the claim or defense in that action.4 In other words, the
judgment is an absolute bar to a second action on the same cause of
action. But, in the second type of situation, where the two suits are
on different causes of action, the judgment in the first suit is con-
clusive only of those matters which were actually determined in that
action.5 And such judgment may or may not have the effect of a bar,
depending upon the materiality of the concluded matter to the cause
of action asserted in the second suit.
service basis, (c) unavailability of facilities, and (d) reluctance of physicians
to urge it because ihey do not want to appear to be soliciting 'business. The
co6perative scheme under discussion would go a long way towards alleviating
this situation.
1 Rabil v. Farris, 213 N. C. 414, 196 S. E. 321 (1938).
2 Eller v. Carolina & Northwestern Ry., 140 N. C. 140, 52 S. E. 305 (1905);
Painter v. Norfolk & Western R. R., 144 N. C. 436, 57 S. E. 151 (1907) ; Fer-
guson v. Rex Spinning Co., 207 N. C. 496, 177 S. E. 640 (1934).8Fowler v. Osborne, 111 N. C. 404, 16 S. E. 470 (1892); Garret v. Ken-
drick, 201 N. C. 388, 160 S. E. 349 (1931).
'See Cromwell v. Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 352, 24 L. ed. 195, 197 (1877).
'Cromwell v. Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 24 L. ed. 195 (1877).
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It is fairly clear that the principal case is not governed by the
first-mentioned application of the doctrine. In most jurisdictions it
is held that the child's right to recover for personal injuries and the
parent's right to recover for loss of services and expenses constitute
separate causes of action,8 the theory being that there has been an in-
vasion of two different interests 7-that of the child in bodily security,
and that of the parent in the services of the child. Hence, recovery by
the child of damages for personal injuries will not bar an action by the
parent for loss of services ;8 nor will recovery by the parent defeat the
action of the child.9
Since the determinative issue in the instant case-whether certain
conduct of the defendant constituted negligence toward the child-was
decided in the former suit, the second-mentioned branch of res judicata
applies if other requirements are met. This leads to the inquiry: What
persons are bound by findings in a previous action?
Subject to some exceptions,10 only parties to the former action and
their privies are bound thereby. A person is considered to have been
a party when he was a party of record" or, under certain circum-
stances, when he participated in the suit.' 2  He is also treated as a
6Karr v. Parks, 44 Cal. 46 (1872) ; Shields v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 Ati.
323 (1934); Slaughter v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 28 Ky. Law Rep. 665,
90 S. W. 243 (1906), rehearing denied, 28 Ky. Law Rep. 1343, 91 S. W. 713
(1906) ; Wilton v. Middlesex R. R., 125 Mass. 130 (1878) ; Forsythe v. Central
Mfg. Co., 103 Tenn. 497, 53 S. W. 731 (1899) ; see Burns v. Eminger, 84 Mont.
397, 405, 276 Pac. 437, 441 (1929).
'There is another theory having some support. In Callies v. Reliance Laun-
dry Co., 188 Wis. 376, 206 N. W. 198 (1925), 42 A. L. R. 717 (1926), it was
held that the only primary right invaded was that of the child, the parent's
cause of action being derived from the child through assignment by operation
of law. See Rabil v. Farris, 213 N. C. 414, 418, 196 S. E. 321, 323 (1938)
(dissenting opinion). But if it is assumed that a separate action can be brought
on the assigned portion of the claim, the origin of the cause of action would
seem to have no bearing on the question in the principal case. Granted that,
on the theory of the substantive law, the parent cannot recover unless the
child can, and that the reason is founded on a rule of law as distinguished from
a coincidence of fact, the question before us in the principal case still remains
-can a determination in another action that the child cannot recover prevent
the parent from showing, for the purposes of his action, that the child is en-
titled to recover, when the parent was only a nominal or representative party
to the child's action?
'Karr v. Parks, 44 Cal. 46 (1872) ; Forsythe v. Central Mfg. Co., 103 Tenn.
497, 53 S. W. 731 (1899).
'McNamara v. Logan, 100 Ala. 187, 14 So. 175 (1893); Slaughter v. Nash-
ville, C. & St. L. Ry., 28 Ky. Law Rep. 665, 90 S. W. 243 (1906); see Reut-
kemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 351, 161 N. W. 290, 294 (1917).
" Persons not parties are bound by actions in rein. See McLurg v. Terry,
21 N. J. Eq. 225, 228 (Ch. 1870). The cases where, a person is bound, even
though not a party, because his obligation contemplates such a result are ex-
plainable on grounds other than res judicata. Slattery v. Schapero, 217 Mass.
71, 104 N. E. 440 (1914) (judgment against constable is conclusive on surety
on his official bond because, the condition of the bond being broken when such
judgment is rendered, the contract of the surety contemplates such a result);
Otis v. St. Paul, 94 Minn. 57, 101 N. W. 1066 (1904).
u 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §430. 1 See notes 18, 21, infra.
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party when he was represented by a party18 or when he was under a
duty to become a party to the suit.' 4 Although parties of record are
ordinarily bound in their individual capacities under the doctrine of
res judicata, exceptions are made for nominal or formal parties,1 and
for those who sued or defended in a capacity other than a personal or
individual one. 16  Thus a person is not bound individually when he
was litigating another's rights, i.e., acting in a representative capacity,
unless he also litigated individual rights of his own.' 7 In the principal
case, whether the parent be deemed a nominal, or a representative,
party to the child's suit, he should not, under these rules, be bound
as a party of record by the former judgment; he was not litigating
any of his own rights.
Before a person is held to have been a party by participation, he
must have appeared openly,' 8 must have been able to control and direct
the proceedings,' 9 and must have had "some substantial interest which
he was promoting or defending in the case, other than a mere personal
or general interest in the questions involved, or in the decision as a
precedent." 20 It would seem that the requirements of control and open-
ness of participation are easily met in the instant case-the next friend
having complete control of the case, and his presence being attested by
the record. But the requirement of interest in the suit is a real re-
quirement. If the mere fact of participation were enough, the dis-
tinction between parties in their individual and representative capaci-
ties would be completely denied. The nature of the interest necessary
to bind the participant is an illusive one; but generally the participant
Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 41 Sup. Ct. 338, 65
L. ed. 673 (1921); Yarborough v. Moore, 151 N. C. 116, 65 S. E. 763 (1909);
1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §435.
1 This rule would seem to have little bearing on the principal case. It re-
fers to persons who are liable over to a party to a prior suit and who are under
a duty to appear when given notice. Lexington v. Aetna Indemnity Co., 155
N. C. 220, 71 S. E. 214 (1911). Unless such persons actually appear in the
first suit, they can be concluded by the findings therein only in the action over
against them. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §430. But see Gadsden
v. George H. Crafts Co., 175 N. C. 358, 368, 95 S. E. 610, 614 (1918).
'Walker v. Philadelphia, 195 Pa. 168, 45 Ad. 657 (1900); see Womack v.
St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 484, 100 S. W. 443, 447 (1907).
" Troxell v. Delaware, L. & W. R. L, 227 U. S. 434, 33 Sup. Ct. 274, 57
L. ed. 586 (1913); Travis Glass Co. v. Ibbetson, 186 Cal. 724, 200 Pac. 595
(1921) ; Bernard v. Merril, 91 Me. 358, 40 Atl. 136 (1898); Bamka v. Chicago,
St. P. & 0. Ry., 61 Minn. 549, 63 N. W. 1116 (1895).
'5Corcoran v. Chesapeake Canal Co., 94 U. S. 741, 24 L. ed. 190 (1877)
(trustee for certain bondholders was estopped, in a later suit brought by him as
owner of some of the 'bonds, to controvert facts found in a suit where he rep-
resented the bondholders, since the trustee represented himself as one of the
bondholders); Jenkins v. Nolan, 79 Ga. 295, 5 S. E. 34 (1887).
2s If the opposing party does not know of the participation it would be in-
equitable to conclude him by the findings in the action; and, according to the
requirement of mutuality, if he is not to be concluded it would be inequitable
to conclude the participant. 1 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §433.
" Ibid. 1Ibid.
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is found to have been directly affected by the outcome of the action,
to have suffered or gained substantially as a result of the decision in the
former suit.21 He may have been affected because he had an interest
in the subject-matter of the suit,22 or because he was under an obliga-
tion conditioned in some way upon the outcome of the former action.
23
For example, the real owner of a negotiable note is bound by the find-
ings in a suit against the maker by a plaintiff who had possession of
the note, when the real owner appeared in that suit and defended for
the maker on the ground that the plaintiff was not the owner.24  Or
where several insurance companies, issuing identical policies to a per-
son, agree among themselves to share pro rata the expenses of all
suits brought by the insured on the policies and appoint a committee
to conduct the defense of such suits, each defendant is bound by the
findings in any one of the suits.25  The possibility of having to pay
part of the costs gives each a sufficient interest in the suits to make
it a party by participation. Again, where an injured person has an
action against an insured tort-feasor and against the insurance com-
pany on insured's policy, if the insurance company defends the action
against the tort-feasor, the findings therein are conclusive upon the
insurance company in an action by the injured person against it on the
policy.2 6  The fact that the insurance company, if given notice to
appear and defend, would be bound by the findings in such prior suit
when asserted by the tort-feasor in an action for indemnity, gives the
insurance company such an interest in the action against the tort-feasor
as to make it a party when it does appear off the record. Since the
parent, in the principal case, is not substantially or legally affected
by the outcome of the child's action for damages for personal injuries,
the parent should not be held a party by participation.
Even though not a party a person may be bound by a judgment
in a prior action when he is in privity with a party thereto. Privity
means "privity in estate" or "mutual or successive relationship to the
same right of property". 27 A necessary requirement to establish privity
with a party is that the privy must acquire his interest in the subject-
"Litchfield v. Crane, 123 U. S. 549, 31 L. ed. 199 (1887); Helm v. Zarecor,
213 Fed. 648 (D. Tenn. 1913) ; Parker v. Moore, 59 N. H. 454 (1879) ; notes
Ann. Cas. 1916E, 151, (1912) 37 L. R. A. (x. s.) 957.
'Montgomery v. Vickery, 110 Ind. 211, 11 N. E. 38; Stoddard v. Thomp-
son, 31 Iowa 80 (1870).
' See notes 25, 26, infra.
; Stoddard v. Thompson, 31 Iowa 80 (1870).
- Greenwich Ins. Co. v. N. & M. Friedman Co., 142 Fed. 944 (C. C. A. 6th,1905).Ildetropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Albritton, 218 Ky. 16, 282
S. W. 187 (1926).
' See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 33. S.
111, 129, 32 Sup. Ct. 641, 643, 56 L. ed. 1009, 1022 (1912) ; 2 BrACK, JUDGMENTS
(1891) §549; 1 FREMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §438.
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matter of the former action after that action.2 8 In view of the fact
that the parent's rights are as complete before the child's suit as after
it, and in view of the fact that the parent could sue before the child's
action if he desired, it cannot be said that he is in privity with a party
to that action.
While it appears that the decision in the principal case is in accord
with all the cases on the point in holding that the doctrine of res jud-
cata is inapplicable,29 the objections to the result are apparent. The
plight of the defendant, in having to submit to another jury the issue
of his negligence after one jury had found in his favor, is provocative
of sympathy; especially is this so when the later contest is, in reality,
between the same persons. And the public interest might well require
"Womack v. St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S. W. 443 (1907); Gill v. Porter,
176 N. C. 451, 97 S. E. 381 (1918); Cressler v. Brown, 79 Okla. 170, 192 Pac.
417 (1920); 1 FE EmAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §§438, 440.
Shiels v. Audette, 119 Conn. 75, 174 At. 323 (1934); Hooper v. Southern
Ry., 112 Ga. 96, 37 S. E. 165 (1917); Henry v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry., 98
Kan. 567, 158 Pac. 857 (1916); Balandran v. Compton, 141 Kan. 321, 41 P.
(2d) 720 (1935); Akers v. Fulkerson, 153 Ky. 228, 154 S. W. 1101 (1913);
McGreevey v. Boston Elevated Ry., 232 Mass. 347, 122 N. E. 278 (1919);
Bamka v. Chicago, St. P. & 0. R. R., 61 Minn. 549, 63 N. W. 1116 (1895);
Scanlon v. Kansas City, 325 Mo. 125, 28 S. W. (2d) 84 (1930); Malsky v.
Schumaker & Ettlinger, 7 Misc. 8, 27 N. Y. Supp. 331 (Common Pleas, N. Y.
City and County 1894); Syczhk v. Szczerbaniewicz, 233 App. Div. 342, 252
N. Y. Supp. 780 (4th Dep't 1931); Bridger v. Asheville & S. R. R., 27 S. C.
456, 3 S. E. 860 (1887) ; Hall v. Waters, 132 S. C. 117, 128 S. E. 860 (1925);
Guy v. Fisher & Burnett Lumber Co., 93 Tenn. 213, 23 S. W. 972 (1893);
Scheiderer v. A. George Schulz Co., 169 Wis. 6, 171 N. W. 660 (1919). Cases
where the next friend in the child's action was allowed to bind the same tort-
feasor in his later action for loss of services are distinguishable, as far as
the bare holding is concerned, in that they represent only a departure from the
orthodox requirement of mutuality. Bradbury v. Humphrey, 162 Ill. App. 434
(1911); Brown v. Missouri P. R. R., 96 Mo. App. 164, 70 S. W. 527 (1902)
(husband and wife), overruled by Womack v. St. Joseph, 201 Mo. 467, 100 S. W.
443 (1907); Morris v. Kansas City, 117 Mo. App. 298, 92 S. W. 908 (1906)
(husband and wife) (also overruled by the Wonack case); Anderson v. Third
Ave. R. R., 9 Daly 487 (N. Y. 1881), overruled by Malsky v. Schumaker &
Ettlinger, 7 Misc. 8, 27 N. Y. Supp. 331 (Common Pleas, N. Y. City and
County 1894); Lindsay v. Danville, 46 Vt. 144 (1873) (husband and wife).
These cases, except the Bradbury Case, were relied upon by the dissenting
opinion in the principal case. Binding a person who was a party, in favor of a
person who was not a party, to a prior action is very different -from allowing a
person who was a party to conclude one who was not. A person who was not
a party is usually allowed to bind a party only when an indemnitee seeks to
bind a plaintiff by findings in an action by such plaintiff against his indemnitor
(in the -broad sense of the word) ; but it has been urged that the requirement
that the person in whose favor the estoppel is worked must have been a party
to the prior action be done away with entirely. See note (1926) 35 YALE L. J.
607. Compare with the dissent in the principal case Lyon v. Rhode Island Co.,
38 R. I. 252, 94 At1. 893 (1915) (where defendant iort-feasor was allowed to
introduce in evidence against the parent, in an action for damages for the
parent's personal injuries, a transcript of testimony adduced in an action against
same defendant brought by parent as next friend of his minor child for dam-
ages for personal injuries); Hartis v. Charlotte Electric Ry., 162 N. C. 236,
78 S. E. 164 (1913) (where a deposition taken in an action by husbapd and
wife for her personal injuries was allowed to be introduced against the same
Aefendant in an action by the husband as administrator).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
an end to the litigation of that issue. But the opinion of the minority
in the principal case, if followed, would not completely eliminate these
objections. If the parent chose to bring his own action first, or if he
chose not to act as next friend in the child's action if that action were
brought first, he could deprive the defendant of the protection of the
minority decision. And, if the parent's action were brought first, it
does not seem that the defendant should be protected at the expense
of binding the child by the judgment against his parent. The child
would not have been a party, either of record, by representation, or
as a participant, to the parent's former action. Thus, the effectiveness
of the minority solution depends upon the will of the parent. But
even as the law is today, if the parent is willing, the objections men-
tioned can be avoided. If the -two actions were brought at the same
time, although, under our present joinder provisions, they could not
be joined,30 they could probably be consolidated.31  And there is au-
thority to the effect that if the parent were to recover, or attempt to
recover, damages for loss of services and expenses in the child's ac-
tion, he could not later assert those same items in his own suit.32 The
minority opinion is open to the further objection that it might discour-
age persons from acting in a representative capacity in suits in which
none of their individual rights are to be litigated, at least when such
persons are free to decide whether they will so act
Perhaps the objective which the minority seeks could be better
achieved by abolishing the parent's cause of action, or by making
joinder of the two causes of action compulsory. The question 'of
whether either of these steps is desirable is beyond the scope of this
note.
WILLIAM R. DALTON, JR.
' Thigpen v. Kinston Cotton Mills, 151 N. C. 97, 65 S. E. 750 (1909). This
case applies the statutory provision in North Carolina that all the parties must be
affected by each cause of action s6ught to be joined. N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie,
1935) §507. This requirement has been omitted from the joinder of causes
section of the New York Civil Practice Act. N. Y. CIv. PRAc. Aer §258. See
CLARK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928) 302.
"Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N. C. 398, 55 S. E. 778 (1906).
'Bowring v. Wilmington Malleable Iron Co., 6 Penne. 332, 67 Atl. 160
(Del. Super. Ct. 1907); Daly v. Everette Pulp & Paper Co., 31 Wash. 252,
71 Pac. 1014 (1903); note (1925) 37 A. L. R. 64.
